Justice in Augustine's City of God by Daniels, Amy Lydia
  
Justice in Augustine’s City of God 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Amy Lydia Daniels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree 
Master of Philosophy in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at 
Stellenbosch University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Dr Annemaré Kotzé 
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences 
 
 
 
 
 
December 2012 
 
  
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DECLARATION 
 
By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained 
therein is my own, original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent 
explicitly otherwise stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch 
University will not infringe any third party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety 
or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification. 
 
Amy Lydia Daniels 
'HFHPEHU2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © 2012 Stellenbosch University 
 
All rights reserved. 
  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
iii 
 
Summary 
This thesis outlines Augustine’s thought on justice as articulated in The City of God: against 
the Pagans. The purpose of the study was to investigate the place and role of his convictions 
about justice in his apologetic project.  
To this end, Books 19-22 of The City of God were read within the historical, religious and 
ideological contexts of Augustine’s day. Aspects deemed relevant to the stated goals of the 
thesis and which were therefore surveyed, were pagan-Christian relations and Neo-Platonism 
in the fifth century; the sacking of Rome in AD 410, a perceived injustice which occasioned 
rampant calumnies against the Christians and questions regarding the justice of God; secular 
jurisprudence and legal practice, with a focus on the role of bishops in dispensing justice; 
biblical perspectives on justice. 
A reading of Books 19-22 of the City of God was then done, in which it was found that 
justice was viewed by Augustine as subordinate to, but straining toward the Supreme Good, 
identified as peace. Moreover, it was shown that Augustine’s perspective on justice is 
inextricably linked with his eschatological convictions. These are that God is set to establish 
an eternal City, composed of those who, throughout history, have pledged allegiance to Him. 
That city is characterised by peace and justice, as determined by God. Any peace or 
manifestation of justice in the present age was shown to flow from humankind’s 
predisposition toward self-love (egotism). As such, they are presented by Augustine as a poor 
reflection of the perfect peace and justice that will be established by God. 
With regard to Augustine’s defence of the Christian faith, it was found that he employs a 
model of argumentation which takes as its point of departure the worldviews of his 
opponents, showing up cracks in their thinking. He then presents his own perspective as the 
better alternative. The juxtaposition of the current age, fraught with injustice and chaos, 
against the eternal peace and justice to be established by God, were shown to be important 
selling-points for Augustine. For him, life in the eternal City of God was an irresistible offer, 
which he sought to hold out to his opponents.  
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Opsomming 
Hierdie tesis skets Augustinus se denke oor geregtigheid soos geartikuleer in Die Stad van 
God: teen die Heidene. Die doel van die studie was om die plek en die rol van sy oortuigings 
oor geregtigheid in sy apologetiese projek te ondersoek.  
Met hierdie doel is Boeke 19-22 uit Die Stad van God gelees binne die historiese, 
godsdienstige en ideologiese kontekste van Augustinus se tyd. Aspekte wat as relevant 
beskou is tot die vermelde doelwitte van die tesis en wat dus ondersoek is, is verhoudings 
tussen heidene en Christene asook Neo-Platonisme in die vyfde eeu; die plundering van 
Rome in 410 n.C., ’n vermeende onreg wat aanleiding gegee het tot onbeteuelde laster 
teenoor die Christene en vrae oor die geregtigheid van God; sekulêre wetsgeleerdheid en 
regspraktyk, met die fokus op die rol van biskoppe in die beoefening van regspraak; bybelse 
perspektiewe op geregtigheid. 
’n Vertolking van Boeke 19-22 uit Die Stad van God is daarna gedoen, waarin daar bevind is 
Augustinus het gemeen dat geregtigheid ondergeskik is aan, maar wel streef na, die Hoogste 
Goed, wat naamlik as vrede geïdentifiseer word. Verder is daar getoon dat Augustinus se 
perspektief op geregtigheid onlosmaaklik verbind is aan sy eskatologiese oortuigings. Hierdie 
oortuigings is dat God ’n Ewige Stad sal vestig wat saamgestel is uit dié wat deur die 
geskiedenis heen trou aan Hom gesweer het. Daardie stad word deur vrede en geregtigheid 
gekenmerk, soos dit deur God bepaal is. Daar word gewys daarop dat enige vrede of 
manifestasie van geregtigheid in daardie tyd bloot voortgevloei het uit die mens se 
geneigdheid tot selfliefde (egotisme). Dít word deur Augustinus voorgehou as ’n swak 
weerspieëling van die volmaakte vrede en geregtigheid wat deur God ingestel sal word. 
Wat betref Augustinus se verdediging van die Christelike geloof, is daar bevind dat hy ’n 
redeneringsmodel gebruik wat die wêreldbeskouings van sy opponente as uitgangspunt 
gebruik, en só die foute in hul denke uitwys. Hy bied dan sy eie perspektief as die beste 
alternatief aan. Die naasmekaarstelling van die huidige era, vol ongeregtigheid en chaos, 
teenoor die ewige vrede en geregtigheid wat deur God ingestel sal word, is uitgewys as 
belangrike verkoopspunte vir Augustinus. Vir hom was die lewe in die Ewige Stad van God 
’n onweerstaanbare aanbod wat hy aan sy opponente wou voorhou.  
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
Augustine’s City of God presents an impressive canvas of themes. Yet at its core it is the tale 
of two cities – the City of Man and the holy City of God – and their origins, development and 
ordained ends (civ. Dei 11.1. trans. Bettenson 2003: 430). An important distinguishing factor 
between these two cities, or kingdoms, is the extent to which justice is manifest in each. At 
the very beginning of Book 4.4 Augustine asks, “Remove justice, and what are kingdoms but 
gangs of criminals on a large scale?” The assumptions behind this question and the 
statements that follow it are that earthly kingdoms do exist, and therefore that justice does 
exist in these earthly kingdoms. Throughout the City of God, however, the City of Man 
(constituted of the kingdoms of this world) is depicted as pervasively corrupt and bound to 
decay. The City of God, on the other hand, is shown to be perfect, enduring unto eternity. It 
follows, therefore, that the two cities display and exercise justice to varying degrees, with 
only the City of God possessing said ‘virtue’ in perfect measure. 
Considering Augustine’s view that the cities in question are comingled (interwoven) in this 
present age, the assertion that the manifestation of justice distinguishes one city from the 
other seems to be a helpful one at first. That the reader is not given a coherent theory of 
justice, however, complicates matters. At a most basic level, then, this thesis serves as an 
attempt at gathering the main tenets of Augustine’s understanding of justice and its working 
in the two cities. This will be done by looking primarily at the final section of the City of God 
(Books 19 to 22).
1
 
Of course, if anything valuable is to be gained from looking at this, arguably Augustine’s 
most preeminent work, it is not enough simply to systematise his thought. The exploration of 
the theme of justice in the City of God, therefore, will be carried out and situated within the 
framework of Augustine’s apologetic project; it will be approached, bearing in mind the 
discourse in which Augustine was engaged, with a view to persuading his interlocutors of the 
legitimacy – indeed the verity – of the Christian perspective. 
It dare not be assumed, however, that Augustine’s own views came about or functioned in a 
vacuum. The stance taken throughout this thesis, therefore, is that even as Augustine sought 
                                                          
1
A summary of the City of God 19-22 has been included as Appendix A to aid the reader in following 
my arguments.  
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to counter the claims of his non-Christian contemporaries throughout the City of God, he will 
have been susceptible to the very same forces that influenced them, whether forces of 
circumstance or thought. It makes sense to ask therefore, what shaped Augustine’s ideas 
regarding justice.  
In summary, this thesis will focus on how Augustine believed justice to function in the Cities 
of God and Man, and how this understanding of justice fitted into his defence of the Christian 
faith. This will be done after looking at Augustine’s philosophical and situational contexts. 
Chapter 2 will deal with contextualising Augustine in this way, while Chapter 3 will deal 
with perspectives on justice – secular and biblical – and the role of the fifth-century bishop in 
the law courts. Thereafter, a discussion of the City of God and the theme of justice will 
constitute Chapter 4. The concluding chapter will present the findings of the rest of the thesis 
and so bring the study to a close. 
 
1.1. Biographical notes 
Before plumbing the depths of Augustine’s complex thought, a cursory look at his life should 
provide clues as to where the focus of the contextual study ought to lie. Although there are a 
number of biographies available to us, the most important source of information regarding his 
life remains the Confessions and it is from this influential work that the following outline is 
primarily taken.  
Aurelius Augustinus was born in 354, in Roman-occupied North Africa, to a Catholic 
Christian mother, Monnica, and a pagan father, Patricius. Although this was not at all unusual 
at the time, it is probably this diversity in the nuclear family, combined with the eclecticism 
that characterised North Africa in the fourth and fifth centuries, that set the boy Augustine on 
the whirlwind path his life was to take. He went from leading an otiose youth in Thagaste, to 
dabbling in Manichaeism during early adulthood in Carthage.  
After disillusionment with the Manichees and their complex doctrines, he embarked on a 
more fervent search for truth while teaching rhetoric in Milan. This developed into an 
insatiable appetite for philosophy. He found himself attracted to the teachings of the 
Platonists, which became an inroad to his return to the teachings of Christianity. Of these last 
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teachings he came to be convinced under the guidance of Ambrose, the bishop of Milan at the 
time. 
Around AD 390, he entered the priesthood and shortly afterward, in AD 395, he took up the 
office of bishop at Hippo Regius, a position he held for forty years, until his death in 430. 
What this office meant and entailed in Augustine’s day is discussed later on. That it gave him 
an authoritative platform from which to speak and write is evident from many of his writings, 
including letter exchanges with prominent men seeking his council or entering into debate 
with him.
2
 It makes sense, in light of his prominence, that he would have been called on to 
comment on the harrowing events of AD 410, when Rome was brought to its knees during a 
three-day sacking by the Visigoths, and it is at this point in his life that we enter into 
Augustine’s story and thought-world. 
1.2. Rationale 
With the sacking of Rome, certain proponents of Roman traditional religion pinpointed 
Christianity’s prohibition of pagan cultic activity as the reason for the city’s misfortune.  One 
way of interpreting this hostility is within the framework of divine retributive justice being 
upheld, with Rome getting its ‘just desserts’ for ignoring the gods of its illustrious past, in 
favour of Christian monotheism. Far from writing a merely occasional work in the face of 
this, however, Augustine chose to answer the charge by presenting the reader with what has 
been described as a compendium of his theology, in which previous thought had had the 
opportunity to mature and settle (Van Oort 1991: 88). Van Oort (1991: 86), with reference to 
Augustine’s earlier sermons and citing Peter Brown, describes the City of God as “the careful 
working out, by an old man, of a mounting obsession [with the two cities]”. Thus, after a long 
process of maturation, what had been thought of extensively and enunciated often in sermons, 
is “joined together systematically like polished building stones” in the City of God 
(Noordmans, quoted in Van Oort 1991: 87). He combats temporal accusations regarding the 
demise of Rome, with the whole spectrum of his theological understanding of the city, of 
both the fallible City of Man and the eternal City of God.  
                                                          
2
 One letter referred to later in this thesis (Ep. 133) was part of an exchange between Augustine and 
Marcellinus, brother of Aspringius the proconsul of Africa. This exchange is illustrative of the 
influence he wielded as a prominent bishop and has been taken from an anthology of his political 
writings, filled with other such examples, and compiled by Atkins and Dodaro (2001). The sermon on 
the sacking of Rome (De excidio urbis Romae), referred to in Chapter 4, has also been taken from this 
anthology. 
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As Augustine argues the case for God and His city as perfectly just in the face of every 
accusation, he considers justice extensively, both from man’s grounded perspective and 
within an eternal framework. The first ten books deal directly with the beliefs of his accusers 
and his answers to them. It is impressive apologetic writing, which Dulles (2005: 85) 
describes as “the most brilliant of all the Christian refutations of pagan religion [until that 
time]”. If one were to envisage this section of the City of God, it might bear some 
resemblance to the lively public debates in which Augustine was often engaged. 
In contrast, the second half might be better envisaged as a lecture, with Augustine on the 
podium, laying the foundations of what Dulles (2005: 85) has called a “total theology of 
history”. It is to the latter, more dogmatic section that we turn to unravel something of his 
understanding of justice. In contrast to Dulles (2005: 85), however, it will be contended 
throughout this thesis that the second half of the City of God is, in fact, part and parcel of the 
very same apologetic project. It contributes to the goal of refuting pagans’ accusations against 
the Christians, while seeking to persuade them to abandon their religious and ideological 
commitments in favour of Christianity. Where Books 1 to 10 conform to the first necessary 
technical requirement of apologies, in that they are primarily “a response of some sort to 
criticism”, Books 11 to 22 constitute extended fulfilment of the other defining characteristic 
of apologetics, by addressing outsiders’ “misconceptions” while advancing “positive views of 
[its] own” (Price 1999: 105-106).    The question that will be addressed in Chapter 5, then, is 
how Augustine’s presentation of the workings of justice fit into this project. 
Thinking about justice is not, of course, confined to the realm of theology or Christian 
philosophy. Rather, it has been addressed by theorists in disciplines such as philosophy and 
sociology, even though it is, first and foremost, the playing field of Law. Although 
Augustine’s contribution to the complex discourse was influential and ought to be 
acknowledged, an exhaustive inter-disciplinary overview is not the chosen route of this 
thesis. Instead, a close reading of the final books of the City of God is offered in Chapter 4. 
What Augustine asserts about justice in this important work is also placed in its immediate 
situational, philosophical and theological context, with Chapters 2 and 3 focussing 
specifically on the relations between pagans and Christians, and the philosophical framework 
which shaped the thought and discourse of the day. This should bring to light – if only 
implicitly – what Augustine has to say about Natural Justice; Retributive Justice and its place 
in the Cities of God and Man; Restorative Justice and the possibility of its existence in the 
City of Man; and Social Justice. 
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1.3.  Overview of literature 
When approaching Augustine and the subject of Justice, one is likely to be left bemused and 
intimidated. This is not only due to the importance of Augustine in the history of Western 
thought (Rist 1996: 18) and the tomes written by and about him as a result, but is also due to 
burgeoning scholarly interest and writing about the period in which he lived (Maas 2010: 
lxvii) and the myriad emphases one might choose in a field as broad as this. The difficulty in 
undertaking a study of this nature, therefore, is to remain true to the subject at hand, and not 
allow oneself to be distracted by the many interesting subjects and issues that are only of 
peripheral importance to this thesis. For this reason, the secondary sources consulted have 
been chosen in line with close readings of relevant primary texts, namely the City of God, 
other texts by Augustine, and the Bible. 
As regards primary sources referred to in the following discussion, Bettenson’s translation of 
the City of God has been chosen on account of its availability and accessibility. When other 
works
3
  by Augustine – and his contemporaries – are cited, the books from which they have 
been sourced are clearly indicated. Furthermore, quotes from the Bible have been taken from 
the English Standard Version (ESV), unless otherwise indicated.  
An excellent point of departure for orientation in thought and writing about Augustine is 
Fitzgerald’s Augustine through the ages: an encyclopedia. Admittedly, having been 
published in 1999, this indispensable resource will be in need of an update in the near future. 
Nevertheless, a number of entries from Fitzgerald’s encyclopaedia have provided good 
insights into and explanations of Augustine’s thought, which have aided this reading of the 
City of God. The Cambridge Companion to Augustine (Stump and Kretzmann 2001), 
furthermore, provided longer reflections and summaries of specific aspects areas of interest, 
such as Augustine’s ethics, political philosophy and biblical interpretation.  
Unfortunately, although much literature exists concerning both the City of God and 
Augustine’s views on justice and politics, studies dedicated specifically to how he works it 
out in the City of God are few and far between. One essay by Eugene TeSelle (1993) has 
however provided much meaningful insight into the three interconnected concepts which 
make up its title, Justice, peace, love. Furthermore, Johannes van Oort’s (1991) investigation 
of the origins of doctrine of the antithesis between the City of God and the City of Man has 
                                                          
3
 Abbreviations of titles are taken from Fitzgerald (1999: xxxv-il). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
6 
 
proven indispensible for getting a handle on this mammoth tome. Indeed the antithesis 
between the two cities is central to this thesis, precisely because it is the central theme of the 
City of God, as the numerous studies of the doctrine attest. Van Oort’s study of the possible 
sources of the doctrine provides an excellent and convincingly-argued model of where to turn 
to when seeking better understanding of this work and the context in which it was born. 
The importance of Augustine’s context to achieving the goals set for this thesis cannot be 
overstated. For this reason, in addition to following Van Oort’s lead, a number of other 
sources have been consulted in order to better understand the worldviews of Augustine’s 
detractors. The most important of these critics are those clumped together under the umbrella 
term “pagan”. To seek to understand the pagan polytheism that Augustine specifically 
counters, Stephen Mitchell and Peter van Nuffelen’s diverse collection of essays, 
Monotheism between Pagans and Christians in Late Antiquity (2010), was consulted in 
conjunction with a number of reference works. Other works relied on heavily include 
Michael Maas’s sourcebook for Late Antique primary texts, Readings in Late Antiquity 
(2010), and – specifically with reference to the functioning of justice in Augustine’s day – 
Kevin Uhlade’s Expectations of Justice in the Age of Augustine (2007). With regard to 
biblical concepts that influenced Augustine and the basics sketched in Chapter 3.2, Wayne 
Grudem’s Systematic Theology was extensively consulted alongside shorter works and 
articles.
4  
                                                          
4
 At this point, my own theological biases must be mentioned. Let it be noted, therefore, that 
discussion of the Bible has been influenced by a conservative, reformed perspective. As far as 
possible, I have tried to steer clear of issues that demand such alliances and have consulted diverse 
sources. While consulting these sources, it has become clear that presentation of too many 
perspectives in this section would divert focus from the goals of this thesis unnecessarily. By and 
large, the outline of the biblical perspective on justice is my own close reading, and takes a number of 
cues from my own reading of the City of God. 
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Chapter 2: Context 
2.1. Contextualising Augustine 
At the beginning to an elucidating introduction to Bettenson’s translation of the City of God, 
Evans (2003; ix) makes two fundamentally important points regarding the composition of 
Augustine’s great work. These are that it is a work of Augustine’s maturity, addressing 
themes and issues dealt with elsewhere, but more coherently and extensively so in the City of 
God; and that although the work is not purely occasional, it will have been partly occasioned 
by the arrival of refugees from the disturbing events at Rome in AD 410 – i.e. the sacking of 
the city by Alaric the Visigoth – and their angry charge to the Bishop of Hippo, to explain the 
collapse of a Christian empire. In addition, if one turns to Augustine’s own preface in Book 
1, it becomes clear that he was spurred on by accusations levelled at Christians by “those who 
[preferred] their own gods” to the God of the Bible, i.e. those who had not been persuaded by 
the truth claims of Christianity (civ. Dei 1. preface). Among these, was the charge that 
Christianity’s institutionalisation and the subsequent discontinuation of pagan cultic rituals 
were to blame for the weakness of the empire and the sacking of Roma aeterna.  
Even from this very basic information, a picture of Augustine and his world in the years he 
penned the City of God already begins to emerge. Thus it makes sense to ask what led to the 
formation of Augustine’s ideas and doctrines of Justice and the City of God, to describe the 
specific events that eventually moved Augustine to write, to explore the relations of 
Christians and pagans in the empire of the fourth and fifth centuries.
5 
Although the period 
                                                          
5
 Although this thesis focuses solely on the fourth and fifth centuries, let it be noted that these will be 
considered against the backdrop of the era known as Late Antiquity. This period, although its bounds 
are hardly set in stone, spans roughly four to seven centuries. Brown (1998: 1) has offered a 
delineation of the time from the reign of Marcus Aurelius (AD 161-180) to that of Justinian (AD 527-
565), but has elsewhere described it as continuing to the rise of Islam in the seventh century, or to its 
triumph in the Eastern Empire, and the coronation of Charlemagne in AD 800 (Reflected in Brown’s 
The World of Late Antiquity. From Marcus Aurelius to Muhammad. 1971). These differences are 
probably indicative of the complexity of the changes that marked the Empire at the time, as it dealt 
with all manner of pressure, which whittled away at the more homogenous classical culture. The 
pressure in question originated both from outside the Empire’s borders (in the form of the growing 
strength of barbarian forces on every front) and from within (the most important example being the 
rapid spread and eventual institutionalisation of Christianity). For the purposes of this thesis, although 
the terms “Late Antiquity” and “late antique” will appear from time to time, it is not necessary to take 
any definitive stance on the matter. This is because its use throughout the following discussion merely 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
8 
 
under consideration is notoriously complex, these questions should enable us to focus the 
following discussion only on those aspects which stand in specific relation to the historical, 
situational and philosophical context of the City of God. Having reconstructed the mood of 
the Western empire of the day, and situated Augustine therein, it should become possible for 
us to comment on the City of God meaningfully, and to distil a coherent view on justice in 
relation not only to the happenings of the day, but also to the ideas in circulation at the time. 
The three issues outlined above will shape this chapter. Thus we shall look first at 
pagan/Christian dynamics, before moving on to discuss the secular thought of Late Antiquity, 
which influenced Augustine and against which he sought to argue
6
. Finally, the sacking of 
Rome will be outlined briefly. 
2.1.1.  Pagan7-Christian Relations 
It is generally agreed that the Mediterranean world of Late Antiquity – when considered 
against the preceding era – was characterised by relative instability and fluidity. The face of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
serves to highlight the possible influence of its characteristic dynamism and complex national 
relations on the Zeitgeist of the fourth and fifth centuries. See also Maas (2010: lxiii, lxxi-lxxxi). 
6
 There is ever the danger of presenting a false dichotomy between the sacred and the secular when 
treating of each separately. For all their differences, it must also be affirmed that worldviews present 
at the same time and within the same locality necessarily influence one another, with perspectives and 
emphases either overlapping – i.e. concepts from each worldview become part of others’ ideological 
toolboxes – or causing sharp and definitive differentiation. The separation of the dominant philosophy 
of the era and the religious currents with which it interacted in this reading of Augustine’s context 
should, in fact, present us with the conceptual tools to dig effectively through Augustine’s own 
thought, without detracting from our awareness of the interconnectedness described here. 
7
 The term “pagan” must be understood as shorthand for every ideology apart from Christianity – or, 
for Christians of the time, in reference to everyone other than Christians, Jews and Samaritans, as all 
of them opposed the religious syncretism and emperor worship that had been so important to Roman 
‘unity’ in preceding centuries (Maas 2010: 174; Evans 2003: xviii-xxii). Brown (2007: 248) notes that 
the term “paganus” used in this way was an innovation of the Latin church in the fourth and fifth 
centuries, and originally denoted “that which is inferior”. That this attempt at lexicographical self-
differentiation from the pre-Christian Roman Empire and its religion has stuck, bears testimony to the 
rootedness of our own perspective in the seeming triumph of Christianity, even in societies which feel 
the need to define themselves as “post-Christian”. From our Christianised perspective, then, it is easy 
to assume that the institutionalisation of Christianity will have brought about a drastic decline in non-
Christian religious belief and custom. Yet, Maas (2010: 174) describes the religious mood of Late 
Antiquity as one in which the majority of people did have something of a religious consciousness, as 
they believed in the participation of divinities in all aspects of life, but that not most of these would 
not have identified themselves as followers of any particular faith or even as devotees of any 
particular god(s).  
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Roman society took on a more markedly heterogeneous character than before. This was due 
in part to mounting pressure on all fronts, as a result of the growing strength of barbarian 
forces. Furthermore, by the time Augustine wrote, the empire had experienced a slow shift in 
the forms of public community. Where every Roman’s cultural identity and pride had 
previously been rooted in the history of the ancient city, the Christian church now altered the 
tone and emphasis, and as Peter Brown (1998: 1) notes, no aspect of life lay unaffected by the 
change. For “the life of the individual, the life of the family, even matters as intimate as the 
perception of the body itself came to be seen in relation to changing social contexts, 
associated with the rise of new forms of community” (Brown 1998: 1). Of course these shifts 
in societal foundations were the result of a number of interesting political, cultural and 
religious developments. The finer details of these developments fall outside the scope of this 
thesis; suffice it to say that the tensions resulting from the institutionalisation of Christianity 
and the empire’s descent into chaos by the third century and into the fifth, are essential to 
understanding Augustine’s own views and the points of view he addressed. 
First, let us bear in mind that although the establishment of Constantinople as a capital under 
Constantine and the cultural diversity across the empire had stripped Rome of much of its 
former glory, it remained a symbol of stability and longevity for Augustine’s compatriots in 
the Western empire, regardless of their religious persuasion. In the late fourth century, the 
pagan historian Ammianus Marcellinus (History 14.6.3-6) described aged Rome in most 
elevated terms, as having come to “ultimate supremacy” and as “destined to live as long as 
men shall exist”, even amidst the numerous wars carried on about her walls. This, he puts 
down to the shared favour of Virtue and Fortune, bestowed on Rome since her foundation 
(cited in Maas 2010: 48). 
Whatever one chooses to make of this, it was an unquestioned part of Roman cultural 
identity, for patriots from across the empire thought of themselves as standing on the 
shoulders of the conquerors and victors of old, despite the influence of Christianity. By AD 
200, Rome’s dominion stretched from Spain to Mesopotamia and from Britain to North 
Africa, with vast differences in the conquered cultures of every region. By Augustine’s day, 
however, that unified diversity had turned to division which, though it mostly bubbled 
unnoticed beneath the surface, would come to the fore under pressure (Brown 1971: 14-16; 
Cameron 1993: 3-4). Political instability however, as much as it permeated the very air 
breathed by Augustine and his contemporaries, is only of peripheral importance to this thesis. 
With the City of God, this North-African bishop takes a stance primarily against the pagans. 
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Considering his pre- and post-conversion concern and engagement with competing claims to 
religious authority
8
, this is not surprising and also makes the tension between Christians and 
their counterparts of special interest.  
The tensions between Christians and pagans often came to a head in heated intellectual 
debate (Brown 2007: 248) and even outbursts of physical violence (Maas 2010: 175). By the 
time Augustine wrote his great defence of the faith, then, he had lived through the brief but 
inevitable attempt at a return to paganism under the emperor Julian in AD 361 to 363, and the 
official ban on pagan worship throughout the empire thirty years later. In 384, he also 
witnessed – possibly only indirectly – the dispute regarding Gratian’s order to remove the 
Altar of Victory from the Senate house
9
, between his patron, the pagan aristocrat 
Symmachus, and Ambrose Bishop of Milan, who would soon be instrumental in Augustine’s 
own conversion to Christianity (Evans 2003: xv; Maas 2010: 199-200). Neither of these 
events is dealt with by Augustine in any notable depth in the City of God, yet they are helpful 
to us inasmuch as they provide some insight into the climate in which Augustine lived and 
wrote.  
Closer to home, as the bishop of Hippo, he had experienced and commented on the open 
conflict between Christians and pagans in the face of the Christianisation of the empire. In a 
letter written in 408, he wrote a dismayed account of an uncurbed pagan ritual at Hippo that 
had led to the stoning and burning of a church building, as well as the death of “one of the 
servants of God” (cited in Maas 2010: 198). This kind of hostility from non-Christians is 
understandable, of course, for any enforcement of Christian mores and ideology necessarily 
meant violence against the pagan gods and their rites.  
Furthermore, most especially in North Africa, Christians did not present a united front, as the 
church wrestled with doctrinal and practical differences within the fold, e.g. between 
                                                          
8
 In his Confessions, Augustine sought to chronicle his search for the truth, sparked by an encounter 
with Cicero’s Hortensius and during which he moved through something like Christian Deism, 
Manichaeism, and after a period of disillusionment, to Neo-Platonism and Christian Theism. More 
detailed description of this development may be found in Conf. 1-9. 
9
 Gratian (emperor from 375-383) ordered the cessation of pagan religious practices, including the 
removal of the Altar of Victory, which had known the Senate house as its home since the glory days 
of Augustus (Maas 2000: 190). After much dispute and public outcry – including an official plea to 
the new emperor Valentinian II by Symmachus (Maas 2000: 190-191) – the altar was eventually 
removed in 384. 
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Catholics and Donatists, who were not drastically different from Catholic Christians (Miles 
2008: 80-81) although they espoused a hyper-realised eschatology (Miles 2008: 83). In 
addition, the existence of groups beyond the bounds of orthodoxy, but who used the same or 
similar language to the Christians – most notably such Gnostic sects as the Manichees (Conf. 
3.3-10) – added to the perceived diversity of Christianity.10  
This appearance of disunity, it is fair to assume, will have confused observers of the church 
and possibly fuelled their hostility. From these examples, it becomes possible to infer that 
religious intolerance as the cause of civil unrest in the empire will already have been widely 
discussed and will have influenced much public discussion by 410. Taken with the instability 
caused by the barbarian invasions of the Western empire – however glacial the pace thereof – 
and the disruption of Rome's stabilising function in the Western empire, it seems clear that 
late antique psychology was partly shaped by fear, suspicion and prejudice. 
One dare not assume, however, that Augustine was only engaging with naïve or uninformed 
religious zealots, hell-bent on seeing the downfall of the Christian church. Certainly zeal will 
have had much to do with the wild accusations of Christian culpability in Rome’s weakness 
and sacking, however the level at which Augustine addresses these grievances is more 
sophisticated. For all its civil and religious discord, the climate in the empire of Augustine's 
day was also fairly sober, providing the perfect space for both verbal and written debate, 
making for well-informed, questioning and critical upper classes. As our discussion 
progresses, it will become clear that Augustine’s City of God engages with Platonism, for it 
                                                          
10
 This has contributed to the view of many scholars that this perceived diversity is the most accurate 
possible picture of early Christianity (e.g. Margaret Miles whose work has been indispensible in the 
preparation for writing this thesis). Concentrating specifically on Christianity in the fifth century, 
Miles (2008: 71) makes the point that reference to fringe groups as “heretical” or denial of their 
legitimacy as permutations of Christianity is both misguided and unthinkingly follows in the tradition 
of Church history’s tendency to begin with “the hindsight of a late-fourth-century triumphant church 
and […] reach behind that fait accompli to identify its development or emergence”. This may be, but 
to ignore the fact that we do now, in fact, stand as observers from beyond the establishment of 
Christian orthodoxy and its amendments, reforms, revivals etc., is to underestimate our own 
rootedness in time and culture. To differentiate between what was to become orthodox Christian 
doctrine and fringe movements is not, as has been alluded to, a failure to take the “intellectual and 
ethical commitments of the full spectrum of North African Christians” into consideration (Miles 2008: 
71). Instead, we try to evaluate movements in relation to the orthodoxy to which Augustine 
contributed and held – fully aware of our own Christian and post-Christian biases. 
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had filtered down from the intelligentsia and permeated the popular worldview.
11
 Platonism 
provided a degree of philosophical (intellectual) legitimisation of pagan religion with which 
many of his interlocutors would have been acquainted. The acceptance of these philosophical 
trends was possible, because the philosophers consistently acknowledged divinity, even as 
they redefined it (Siniossoglou 2010: 127-128).  
Part of the goal of this thesis is to identify the rhetorical devices and weapons used by 
Augustine in the face of pagan religious and philosophical opposition, to persuade proponents 
of such views of Christian truth claims. This requires some understanding of the thought 
world of the fourth and fifth centuries. 
 
2.1.2. The Philosophical Framework of Late Antiquity: Pervasive 
Platonism 
Augustine was acquainted with, and influenced by secular writers and philosophers. 
Although some have contended that his familiarity with secular (Greek) philosophy was 
largely mediated by Ciceronian translation and interpretation of Greek philosophy and 
popular reception thereof (Rist 1996: 8-9), Augustine’s understanding and ability to use the 
structures and concepts of Greek philosophy should not be underestimated. This should not 
                                                          
11
 Although Platonism will be referred to repeatedly throughout this thesis, it is worth noting that the 
permutation of Platonism prevalent by Augustine’s day is more precisely referred to as 
“Neoplatonism”. This terminology was, however, a later development, which Augustine and his 
contemporaries will not have been familiar with. Furthermore, Augustine does not distinguish too 
sharply between the doctrines of Plato and those of Neoplatonists (although he does mention some 
differences via Varro, in civ. Dei 19.1). Following closely on the heels of Middle Platonism which 
sought, in part, to return to “Platonism-proper” of the Old Academy after a brief departure by the New 
Academy (Blackburn 2005: 233), Neoplatonism would carry on this project, although it added 
religious elements and Pythagorean and other classical doctrines (Blackburn 2005: 249). The religious 
tenets of Neoplatonism were, however, incongruous with – even hostile toward – Christianity (e.g. 
Porphyry, in civ. Dei 19.23). Many of Augustine’s opponents will have been well-versed in the 
ideas/doctrines of Platonism, as it seems to have been a shaping force in fourth and fifth-century 
thought. Indeed Augustine has been described by many, such as Dulles (2005: 75) as a Platonic 
Christian, or at least as one heavily reliant on his Platonic philosophical heritage and the thought of 
his mentor, Ambrose of Milan. This is not a new insight into Augustine’s ‘thoughtworld’, for in Conf. 
7.9-10, we read his own account of how he became acquainted with platonic philosophy. Instead of 
showing its every error as one might expect of an apologist, he praises it for aiding his understanding 
of the eternal, divine nature of Jesus as the Incarnate Word of God as expressed, for example in John 
1:1-18 (Conf. 7:9 trans. Pine-Coffin 1961: 144f).  
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surprise us, for Roman education even into the fourth and fifth centuries focussed on a 
number of standard texts in both Latin and Greek. Moreover, those, such as Augustine, who 
chose to deepen their understanding of the art of rhetoric with a view to entering the public 
(political) arena, were trained in every manner of argumentation and exposed to the works of 
great orators and writers. Indeed Rist (1996: 19) notes that the youth Augustine would have 
had his mind steeped in the likes of Cicero, Vergil, Terence and Sallust. As a rhetorician, 
with a focus on teaching and dismantling rhetorical devices, he will no doubt have been 
further engaged in wrestling with these and other writers. Even after his conversion to 
Christianity, there can be no doubt that Augustine’s knowledge of pagan philosophy still had 
some shaping influence on his thought. Yet, even as the reader is treated to a show of the 
whole spectrum of his vast repertoire in the City of God, his focus remains on the views held 
most strongly by his accusers. 
It has already been mentioned that this thesis will show that Augustine uses the ideas that had 
already become embedded in the collective consciousness of his contemporaries as a launch 
pad as he seeks to counter the accusations of his detractors. He responds to and plays with all 
manner of ideas, a number of which are found in other works of his. These are always 
presented with new twists, however, and highlight different aspects, dependent on the context 
and his purpose (MacCormack 1999: 203). The scope of this thesis does not allow for 
thorough exploration of all the streams of thought that Augustine chose to entertain, often 
with the express purpose of rejecting them. Diverse as the profile of Late Antiquity was, the 
one school of thought that most shaped the intellectual landscape was Platonism as it had 
developed by Augustine’s day. So pervasive was its influence that Bouman (1987: 46) is able 
to assert that parties on either side of the sacred-secular divide staked claims to a platonic 
heritage. Platonic connections with Christianity go beyond mere cultural influence in reading 
biblical texts, however.  
Indeed Augustine notes that Plato was read as affirming some level of monotheism in his 
Timaeus, for Plato writes about a creator god in similar fashion to the creator God of Genesis 
(civ. Dei 8.11). Theories about where these parallels originated from were also widespread, 
such as those rejected by Augustine that Plato had met the prophet Jeremiah or had come 
across and read some Old Testament books of the Prophets at a point during his travels (civ. 
Dei 8.11). However Plato and his successors down to Augustine’s day also supported 
polytheistic worship (civ. Dei 8.12-13). Of course theology was not the primary occupation of 
the philosophers. Yet the tension between mono- and polytheism was as important to the 
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Neo-Platonists who sought to reconcile the two ideas, thus providing pagan religion with 
sophisticated intellectual backing, as it was to Augustine’s arguments against the pagans. 
When we look at the City of God and how Augustine chose to go about defending his faith in 
it, therefore, it is worth exploring the contents of adversaries’ ideological toolbox. 
 In short, Neo-Platonism asserted that the universe ought to be conceived of as a living 
emanation of the One, which was derived from the transcendental, omnipresent God 
described in Plato’s Parmenides (Blackburn 2005: 249). The One, it was taught, had given 
rise to the “realm of ‘nous”’ (ideas, intelligence), which then gave rise to soul/s (Blackburn 
2005: 249). These souls either sank into bodies or remained celestial (Blackburn 2005: 249). 
This aspect of Neo-Platonic natural theology achieves two things, i.e. the affirmation of a 
supreme deity in the “One” and an explanation for the origin of pagan gods as those souls 
who remained celestial. Cerutti (2010: 18) argues that, because these Platonists shaped 
popular philosophy to such a large degree, this is probably where the hierarchical 
organisation of the pagan pantheon of late antiquity has its roots.  
The hierarchy of incorporeal (spiritual) over corporeal also had some bearing on Christianity 
of the time, as is recognisable even in Augustine’s Confessions (Conf. 3.7.12; 1.2.2-1.3.3.) for 
example, where God is characterised as incomprehensible spirit. However, the nature of the 
“One” of Neo-Platonism does not agree entirely with the God of the Bible, who reveals 
Himself (makes Himself known and accessible) to various people, especially in the Old 
Testament.  The “One” of Neo-Platonism is no longer physically present to the universe to 
which it first gave rise – it is entirely other and unknowable, except as an object of worship 
(Blackburn 2005: 280). Nous, though accessible through contemplation by the souls to which 
it gave rise, resides in the mind of the One, but is still entirely other (Blackburn 2005: 280). 
The souls mentioned before, unlike their parent, nous, and the One, are capable of 
transmigration. This explains why these immortal, incorporeal, but substantial entities are 
able to sink into terrestrial bodies within this complex system (Blackburn 2005: 280) and also 
alludes to the nature of humankind and the mind/body dualism that dominated Platonic 
thinking about humanity. These, like many other religious tenets of Platonism, were 
incongruous with – even hostile toward – Christianity (e.g. Porphyry, in civ. Dei 19.23). 
Many of Augustine’s opponents will have been well-versed in the doctrines of Platonism and 
its many intricacies.  
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In the face of the hostility levelled at the faith Augustine defended against his Platonist 
detractors, however, it will be illustrated in greater detail in Chapter 4 below, that he was able 
to meet them at their level and move with relative ease from the Platonic philosophical 
framework, into the realm of Christian theology. Indeed Augustine has been described by 
many, such as Courcelle (cited in Van Oort 1991: 48) and Dulles (2005: 75) as a Platonic 
Christian, or at least as one heavily reliant on his Platonic philosophical heritage and the 
thought of his mentor, Ambrose of Milan. This is not a new insight into Augustine’s thought 
(theology), for in Conf. 7.9-7.10, we read his own account of how he became acquainted with 
Platonic philosophy. Instead of showing its every error as one might expect of an apologist, 
he praises it for aiding his understanding of the eternal, divine nature of Jesus as the Incarnate 
Word of God as expressed, for example in John 1:1-18 (Conf. 7.9). In the City of God, 
however, his acquaintance with Platonism serves the purpose of what he sees as the 
correction of false conclusions. 
At this point in the discussion, what should be clear about the general tenets of the Platonists 
with which Augustine engaged is that although their views allowed for Christian conclusions, 
they were nevertheless utterly opposed to them. Platonists operated from within a well-
developed, hierarchical, metaphysically dualistic system. As such, the eternal One and its 
direct emanations in the realm of ‘nous’ are far superior to the corporeal bodies which some 
sink into in order to inhabit. This low view of the corporeal world – and, by logical extension, 
of the human body – will come into play in 4.2.3 (below), for it is an important part of the 
Platonic critique of the Christian worldview and eschatology that Augustine worked hard to 
defend. Furthermore, a basic inkling of the hierarchical structure of the pagan pantheon, 
which found its intellectual roots in Neo-Platonism, provides a good foundation for 
understanding the way Augustine chose to dismantle the worldviews of those he sought to 
persuade of his own (4.1.1 below). 
 
2.1.3. The Sacking of Rome 
Of course, Augustine did not operate within a purely abstract framework. His thought was not 
confined to the religious and philosophical perspectives that dictated the interaction of people 
with the world. As was stated at the outset of this study, it was the sacking of Rome and all 
that followed in its wake that provided an opportunity for Augustine to put his theology of the 
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two cities on paper in the City of God. When Rome eventually fell – if only temporarily – to 
the Visigoths in 410, it seemed that the end of the world had come. One need only consider 
the reaction of Jerome
12
, as described and quoted by Van Oort (1991: 57), to get a feel for the 
shockwaves that shook the entire empire: 
At Bethlehem Jerome, who had just finished his commentary on Isaiah and was 
about to start an exegesis of Ezekiel could not work for days; for him the fall of 
Rome had inaugurated the end of the world. “After the most radiant light of all 
the nations had been extinguished, what is more, after the head of the Roman 
empire had been cut off and, to be more precise, in one city the entire world 
perished, I fell silent and was humiliated and unable to speak of goodness.”  
(In Ezech. I, praef) 
Considering all that had come to pass during the years leading up to 410, it is almost 
unthinkable that the sacking of the city should have come as a surprise. Reactions such as the 
one above and those of Augustine’s interlocutors – as deduced from his City of God – speak 
volumes about the prevailing worldview of the time. Indeed such patriots, so dismayed at 
Alaric’s conquering force, seemed to have romanticised the fact that their own territories had 
once been conquered by Rome. Thus the pagan historian Rutilius Claudius Namatianus, 
writing an elegy after being forced to leave Rome in 417, describes Rome as the unifier of 
distant nations who profited by becoming her captives, and as the giver of rights and law to 
“men who have never known justice” before having been conquered (cited in Maas 2000: 
23). From this and the reaction of Jerome described above, one gains a sense of the views of 
Augustine's compatriots, regardless of religious commitment: Rome, having grown from 
                                                          
12
 Born ca. 347 into a wealthy Christian family, Jerome was an Illyrian monk, educated in Rome 
(Vessey 1999: 460). He was converted to asceticism around 370 and held various offices within the 
Christian church at Antioch and Constantinople (Vessey 1999: 460). Upon his return to Rome (ca. 
382), after seeking like-minded Christians in the places mentioned as well as Aquilea, it was his hard 
and earnest work in the Scriptures, literary gifts and extensive knowledge of the biblical languages 
which sustained him, as he revised the Latin New Testament among other things. His passionate 
advocacy of asceticism and the life-long virginity of Mary mother of Jesus, however, would see him 
booted from Rome around 385, so that he sojourned in Egypt and Palestine, finally settling in 
Bethlehem where he continued to write – his commentaries on the Prophets being most noteworthy – 
and translate the Old Testament (Vessey 1999: 460). Jerome was often drawn into controversy and 
debate, and his written correspondence with Augustine is peppered with disagreement and debate on 
various issues of the Faith, so that – it would seem – these church fathers influenced and refined one 
another's theological understanding and ways of engaging in debate as public interpreters of the Bible 
and Christian tradition (Vessey 1999: 461). 
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strength to conquering strength, bestowed good gifts on her subjects out of the overflow of 
her virtue, so that all men under her yoke would know goodness and taste the sweetness of 
justice. Furthermore, as one reads the City of God, it is clear that Rome was meant to hold 
this position unto and into eternity, under the watch of the pagan gods, who were believed to 
have sustained and supported Rome all along. These are the beliefs from which Augustine 
launches into his apologetic project. 
  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
18 
 
Chapter 3: Justice in the Age of Augustine 
Augustine’s context at the time he composed the City of God having been sketched, the next 
necessary step in this endeavour to systematise Augustine’s thought on justice and uncover 
what influenced him, is to understand Justice as it functioned apart from Augustine. The goal 
for this chapter, then, is to reach into Augustine’s jurisprudential toolbox and lay out the 
concepts and ideas that may have been used to construct his own views on justice. For the 
intents and purposes of this thesis, however, questions belonging to the realm of 
Jurisprudence proper require, at most, only superficial treatment, for Augustine was not 
concerned with the debates and problems of legal philosophy as such. This section, therefore, 
focuses primarily on the expectations of justice around the fifth century and the bishop’s role 
therein, before looking at the concept from a biblical perspective.  By doing this, it is hoped 
that the most pertinent questions will emerge, and that the most important concepts will 
solidify, thus making meaningful discussion of the City of God and the concept of Justice in 
it possible in Chapter 4.  
 
3.1. Justice in Practice 
Let us begin by considering the expectations of Augustine’s contemporaries – both pagan and 
Christian – and what they understood justice to be. The importance of this exercise lies in the 
idea expressed at the outset, that Augustine, the public figure and most prolific writer, was 
regularly engaged in larger public discourse. In the preceding chapters, it was mentioned that 
as he engaged in public discussion, part of Augustine’s rhetorical arsenal was his immense 
skill at a brand of persuasive apologetics which used the views of his opponents as a 
springboard. This method of argumentation falls under the umbrella of protreptric
13
.  
                                                          
13
 A very helpful overview of the genre of protreptic, including a discussion of the definitions 
available for it and its characteristics, may be found in Kotzé (2003: 50-62). This thesis follows a 
definition which emphasises the communicative purpose of the “speech of exhortation”, given by 
David Aune (1991: 91-124; quoted in Kotzé 2003: 54) as “a lecture intended to win converts and 
attract young people to a particular way of life […] by exposing the errors of alternative ways of 
living by demonstrating the truth claims of a particular philosophical tradition over its competitors.” 
Admittedly, Aune’s definition refers specifically to the “spoken ancestor” of the genre of protreptic. 
Kotzé (2003: 54) convincingly argues, however, that “the aims and characteristics it expresses are the 
same for both versions, spoken and written.” The purpose of protreptic may be widened, furthermore, 
to include both the conversion of non-believers and encouragement of people to progress in their 
chosen worldview, and focuses on both the belief and conduct of its audience (Kotzé 2003: 56) 
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Considering the complexity of the topic at hand, Augustine’s modus operandi in arguing a 
case for Christianity must shape this outline of fifth-century views on justice.  Bearing the 
characteristics and purpose of Augustine’s chosen apologetic tactic in mind as we engage in 
the larger project of unravelling the threads of his discussion of justice, therefore, fifth-
century expectations of justice with which Augustine was confronted and with which he 
would have had to engage, must be traced.  
3.1.1. Secular Jurisprudence 
Across the empire, Roman legal culture served something of a unifying purpose, despite the 
changes in legal code that came with changes of emperor (Maas 2010: 285). It is worth 
noting, however, that although it continued to develop in many directions throughout Late 
Antiquity (Maas 2010: 285), this happened on the back of the so-called classical period of 
Roman law, which extended from about the end of the Republic to the death of the emperor 
Severus Alexander in AD 235 (Johnston 1999: 1).
 14
 As Maas (2010: 285) introduces a 
selection of excerpts from juridical works from the late antique era, he notes that throughout 
this period, emperors issued laws in great numbers. If one recalls the fluidity that 
characterised Late Antiquity even at the level of governance, the implication must be that the 
number of laws passed and abolished by the time Augustine wrote are too numerous to 
consider. Instead of looking at the specifics, therefore, this part of our discussion will seek to 
reach into the collective cultural consciousness and ‘sense of citizenship’ (Bürgersinn) of the 
empire, for that, according to Rehfeldt (1978: 140), lies at the heart of traditional Roman 
ethics.  
It is reasonable to deduce that what is meant by this ‘sense of citizenship’ is an awareness of 
what is best for the empire. Belonging to Roman society – being able to claim Roman 
citizenship – may be seen as that which informed the national sense of what is right/just and 
wrong/unjust. Indeed, it not a stretch to consider the implementation of new laws by 
successive emperors as the stamping of their authority by tapping into the people’s sense of 
citizenship. Allegiance to the laws of the emperor meant allegiance to the empire, and an 
emperor who dispensed justice in the face of flux and uncertainty upheld the ideals of Rome. 
                                                          
14
 Of course, legal activity long preceded the era in question. Johnston (1999: 2-3) discusses the most 
important known sources of law for the classical period. These include the Twelve Tables, which were 
promulgated around 450 BC and are the earliest known example of Roman private law. 
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Rule was both enforced and perceived on the back of loyalty to the empire, whose health and 
longevity was inextricably linked to the establishment and maintenance of justice. 
This attitude is reflected to some degree in a definition of justice first summarised by the 
third-century jurist Ulpian (though presumably the principles expressed by him were already 
part of Roman legal consciousness), and which was later recorded in Justinian’s Digest 
(1.1.10) and Institutes (1.1). The following excerpt is taken from the latter (in Maas 2010: 
285-286): 
Justice is an unswerving and perpetual determination to acknowledge all 
men’s rights. […] The commandments of the law are these: live honourably; 
harm nobody; give everyone his due. 
From this, it becomes clear that for Ulpian, justice is an attitude or internal orientation toward 
doing right by others or, as Wolterstorff (2008: 22) translates it, by “rendering to [each 
person] the rights or deserts that are theirs, that they possess”. The fact that people are seen as 
already having rights (ius suum)
15
,
 
which the just individual is to acknowledge – or better, 
grant or bestow (tribuere) – already gives some indication of what gives content to those 
rights and, by extension, to justice:  the “precepts of the law” (juris praecepta). As Rehfeldt 
(1978: 140) expresses it, the law teaches that to which justice strives:  to do what is right
16
. 
Whether or not Ulpian had in mind only legal justice is not clear, as Wolterstorff (2008: 22) 
notes, before arguing a case for Ulpian’s definition as an explanation of the virtue of justice, 
from which keeping the law necessarily flows. 
Now, considering Ulpian’s influence into the sixth century, due in no small part to its 
prominence in Justinian’s legal project, it is safe to assume that these ideas would have been 
                                                          
15
 The Latin given in brackets throughout this section is taken from the Justinian’s Digest 1.1.10, 
where the definition and exhortation appear together: “Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius 
suum cuique tribuendi. Juris praecepta sunt haec: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique 
tribuere.” (Penington 2012). There are only a handful of instances throughout this thesis when the 
original Latin is given or referred to. The reason for this that the nuances lost in translation are 
important to the argument in this section. A similar principle is employed and explained in 3.2.2 
above. 
16
 Rehfeldt continues this thought and argues that in light of the law giving content to justice, they 
show themselves to be the very same. I shall not take this position in this thesis. Ulpian’s definition 
clearly separates the two, justice being painted as a right orientation or attitude toward the law. It is a 
‘sense of right’ / ‘sense of law’ (what Rehfeldt calls “Rechtsinn”), informed by legal code. 
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shared by Roman citizens of Augustine’s day, at least to some measure. It will be assumed 
throughout this thesis that this is indeed the case, though not blindly so, for as much as this 
ideal will have persisted, a number of factors are at play in forming ideas of this nature. 
Furthermore, as will be expanded on shortly, it was not possible for anybody – especially 
from the poorer classes – to put too much hope in the law and its power to ensure justice 
(Uhlade 2007: 23-24). For although some sense of citizenship remained on account of Rome 
still being regarded as the head of the empire and the symbol of civilisation and the ideals that 
lay at the heart of Roman cultural identity (Van Oort 1991: 58), the legal system was severely 
flawed (Uhlade 2007: 16-20). Thus, the ideal expressed in Justinian’s Digest, The Whole Body 
of Law 6 (in Maas 2010: 287), that legal practitioners would be “servants of justice”, 
“successful everywhere and at all times” was not realised. Reality necessarily deviated from 
the ideal and many other factors, in addition to a sense of citizenship, influenced the 
implementation of law. 
No doubt the diversity that characterised the empire throughout Late Antiquity helped to re-
define Roman identity. An important factor will presumably have been that, where justice had 
always been considered in close connection with the law which flowed out of a ‘sense of 
citizenship’, another force now gave external content to the concept of justice, namely 
Christianity. This fact in itself is possibly problematic, for Christianity had many faces 
throughout the empire, with differences between variants and offshoots being more marked in 
some parts of the empire than in others, and with conflict between Christian groups also 
varying in ferocity (Maas 2010: 110). Outsiders, therefore, were not faced with a unified 
front. By the time Augustine wrote the City of God, however, the bounds of orthodoxy had 
already been decided on to a large extent (Miles 2008: 71). For the purposes of this thesis and 
for the sake of brevity, we shall focus only on the Catholic orthodoxy to which Augustine 
adhered, despite the Catholic Church enjoying less support in North Africa than the more 
conservative Donatists (Miles 2008: 80-81). 
Nevertheless, the role of Christianity in shaping the public and private life of the average 
Roman citizen throughout Late Antiquity should not be underestimated. Perhaps somewhat 
surprisingly, considering the core Christian teaching that “one did not have to be Roman to be 
Christian” (Maas 2010: 111), the Christianisation of the empire did not clash with the ‘sense 
of citizenship’ that shaped the traditional culture and its conceptions of justice. Instead, even 
as it turned classical mores on their heads by “loosening the boundary between the ‘inner 
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barbarians’17 of the empire and classical civilisation”, people became more inward-looking 
and identified “with an urban way of life” (Brown 1971: 112). In other words, although 
Christianised Romans no longer oriented their conduct or measured justice according to the 
standard set by lawmakers only, they still ascribed importance to their cities – most especially 
to the “Holy City” of Rome, the centre of the [Christian] world18 – and so, citizenship still had 
a hand in shaping the identity of Roman patriots, as well as their understanding of justice. 
The importance of the city as the seat of law and justice, then, renders understandable the 
shock and disappointment elicited by Alaric’s 410 Roman offensive, across the religious 
divides of the empire. The earthly centre from which justice was meant to ring out had been 
shaken. Yet even in Rome, the implementation of just ideals had always been fraught with 
difficulty, and breakdowns in justice were as common then as they are for us today. What is 
interesting, however, is that legal matters were not only handled by lawyers schooled in 
Jurisprudence, as it would have been in the classical age of Roman law. Rather, bishops 
shared that responsibility, dividing their attention between the tasks of pastoring and teaching 
their congregations and acting as legal counsellors and arbiters (Uhlade 2007: 3, 29; Van Dam 
2007: 358). Augustine’s position as the bishop of Hippo, therefore, stood him in good stead to 
answer the burning questions of justice. In the following subsection, 3.1.2, we shall see how 
and why that is.  
  
                                                          
17
 Peter Brown’s terminology has been adopted here. When Brown refers to the “outer barbarian”, it is 
with reference to peoples in the unconquered territories surrounding the empire. In contrast, the “inner 
barbarian” is a way of referring to the non-Roman within the empire’s borders. The “loosening” of 
barriers between Romans and the “inner barbarian” comes, by logical inference, from the fact that one 
could live in the empire without being a citizen, and hold to Christianity. This would put one in the 
position of being linked to Roman citizens as “brothers and sisters in Christ” (citizens of the City of 
God), while still being entirely other at a cultural and political level. This idea is also picked up by 
Augustine at the beginning of civ. Dei 19.19, where he makes the point that the attire and chosen way 
of being in the world are almost inconsequential within the context of the church. 
18
 This was mostly the average lay Christian’s perspective on Rome, even after the events of 410 (see 
Brown 1971: 121-122). Jerome expressed a similar emotional tie to the city in reaction to its sacking, 
as was noted in Chapter 2.1.3. above. 
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3.1.2. The Role of the Bishop 
Under Constantine, Christian bishops were first given legal authority to judge cases, only if 
both parties wished their case to be tried in an Episcopal court (Maas 2010: 130). By the time 
Augustine was consecrated as bishop of Hippo, however, he and his colleagues found 
themselves constantly involved in disputes of every kind, as they took on the responsibilities 
of intellectuals, legislators, patrons, judges, and pastors (Uhlade 2007: 3). Thus, bishops did 
not hide themselves in ivory towers as did certain of their counterparts – monks or other 
members of the educated elite – but interacted with people from every walk of life. 
Uhlade (2007: 16) argues that Christians experienced justice in precisely the same way as 
anyone else in Late Antiquity, for although the empire ‘belonged to them’, they were not 
excluded from the consequences of the manipulation, perversion or inept application of the 
law, to their detriment. As shepherds of God’s flock, it was the bishops’ job to protect such 
Christians. Many of them took this burden seriously, some going so far as to push for legal 
reform in favour of God’s flock, but still, these Christian leaders were forced to face the 
limits of their ability to offer security or hope of justice to the ordinary Christians in their 
care (Uhlade 2007: 16). This will undoubtedly have been a difficult reality to accept, for as 
the ‘representatives of God on Earth’ and as expounders of the faith, bishops may have been 
expected and perhaps put pressure on themselves to judge like God (Uhlade 2007: 44-46). 
 
According to his contemporary and biographer, Possidius of Calama, Augustine viewed this 
practical involvement in legal matters as an unnecessary evil, which diverted his attention 
from better things (cited in Uhlade 2007: 11). Because the primary task of bishops remained 
spiritual leadership and service in the way of preaching and celebration of the liturgy (Van 
Dam 2007: 344-345), it is perfectly understandable that the bishop of a large port city like 
Hippo Regius may have been overwhelmed and frustrated by his split focus. The irony, 
however, is that it is precisely his involvement in varying aspects of civil life that shaped 
Augustine’s understanding of people and the world in relation to Scripture, and allowed him 
to expound his theological views in ways his readership would understand. For example, 
Uhlade (2007: 3) notes that in the City of God, Augustine used a classical text
19
 as something 
of an “intellectual sounding chamber” for his theories of justice, while his experience in the 
practical application of the legal system and its failings will have brought him to question the 
                                                          
19
 Cicero’s De republica.  
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possibilities of justice in this world even with God’s own representatives in prominent 
positions, thus affording him a “practical sounding chamber” for his theories and theological 
persuasions. 
 
In short, then, bishops were tasked with reconciling the abstract ideals of justice and the often 
disparate application thereof (Uhlade 2007: 8). As a prominent writer and bishop of his era 
we would do well to pay attention to the view taken by Augustine if we are to understand 
justice in the fifth-century context. From our own vantage point, deeply rooted in a [post-
]Christian ethical meta-narrative, discrepancies between the application of the law, and both 
the perception and experience of justice by the man on the street are similarly prevalent. For 
this reason, there may be real benefit in considering how the founding fathers of common 
law as we know it in the West (Uhlade 2007: 7 in reference to Lupoi and Wormald) dealt 
with the questions levelled at them. Of course, as has already been iterated above, the 
practise of law was not the primary concern of these bishops. At least those, whose thinking 
and priorities squared with Augustine’s, will have seen themselves as servants of God, with 
the responsibility of expounding the Bible and guiding their flocks in accordance with it. In 
light of this, and because Augustine’s City of God is definitively shaped by his reading of the 
Bible, it makes sense to look at what the Bible has to say about justice. 
 
3.2. The Bible on Justice 
Although, as Rist (1999: 11) and others aptly put it, Augustine wrote as a controversialist, it 
must be remembered that he was – and indeed considered himself to be – first and foremost, 
an exegete of the Christian Scriptures. That he took his task to heart is evident in a letter to 
Valerius cited by Van Oort (1991: 46). In this letter, written before he was ordained to the 
position of bishop, Augustine begs for leave to become better acquainted with the Scriptures 
and the church’s handbook of procedures.  Even after taking up office, he continued in the 
endeavour to understand and expound the Scriptures, and to follow the prescriptions of the 
church as faithfully as possible.  
This concern for intimate acquaintance with Christian source texts is what Rudolph Lorenz 
(cited in Van Oort 1991: 46) pinpoints as the most important contributing factor in the 
development of Augustine’s thought. Thus Lorenz posits that Augustine was taken from 
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“neoplatonic introspection” to the realities of church life: the church, the Word of God, the 
sacraments. Although this is valid, Augustine’s reading of Scripture certainly emphasised 
platonic elements of the faith as late as the Confessions and even the City of God (Van Oort 
1991: 91). Yet his biblical focus no doubt also took him far beyond the realm of church life, 
for it will have become the primary shaping force on his post-conversion worldview. He 
brought to his exegesis the full measure of his Christian belief and so expected to find a great 
deal in the Scriptures, to be changed and moved to praise and to have his readers similarly 
affected when faced with the meaning of a given text  (Williams 2001: 60).  Furthermore, as 
a presbyter and bishop, he was expected to interpret human history and experience through 
the lens of Christian truth claims and so, his desire to steep his mind in the Scriptures is an 
understandable one.  
When approaching his interpretation both of the events of 410 and human history more 
generally, in relation to justice, it makes sense to take a moment to reflect on some of what is 
written on the subject in the Bible. Of course there is always a danger that an investigation of 
this kind might unearth conclusions not factored into Augustine’s own readings of a given 
biblical text. Fortunately, Augustine’s extant works are thoroughly soaked in the Christian 
Scriptures, making it possible with the aid of notable Augustinian scholars to pick up his 
characteristic emphases. Indeed Williams (2001: 59) points out that Augustine started writing 
Bible commentary soon after his conversion and continued to do so throughout his life. Of 
course, none of this guarantees the possibility of an independent systematisation of any 
biblical concept that is perfectly harmonious with Augustine’s thought. 
Unfortunately, except perhaps bearing his generally accepted views in mind and steering 
clear of trends that are obviously at odds with his thought as one approaches a text, there is 
little that may be done about the distance between us and Augustine, and the assumptions and 
biases that accompany each as the Bible is approached. For the intents and purposes of this 
study, then, the goal is not to present a detailed and airtight theology of Justice against which 
to measure Augustine’s thought. Rather, because of the appearance of certain biblical 
principles as he writes about the subject, his convictions about the centrality of God’s eternal 
law to just living in the City of God, and the resultant weight and colour of his vocabulary as 
he writes about justice, some of the sources, truth claims and principles applied by Augustine 
are looked at here in their biblical theological context. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
26 
 
For the sake of brevity and because this excursion into the biblical thought-world is but a 
bridge to greater understanding of Augustine’s own thought, only a few points will be 
considered. Furthermore, these will be considered in relation to a framework provided by 
Augustine in civ. Dei 22.30, i.e. his division of history into six periods: (i) from Adam to 
Noah, (ii) from Noah to Abraham, (iii) from Abraham to David, (iv) from David to the 
Babylonian exile
20
, (v) from the exile to the birth of Christ and (vi) from Christ’s first coming 
to His second.
21
  
3.2.1. Justice Determined by God 
In the first period of world history, from the very beginning of the Bible, God is shown to be 
the author and dispenser of justice, with Genesis 2-3 giving an account of the first instance of 
the establishment of law, of transgression and of punishment.
22
 At the Fall (Gen. 3), a 
redefinition of moral and legal standards is attempted (Gen. 2: 17 cf. 3: 5-6), which flies in 
the face of the moral law of God, essentially making the primal human pair guilty of mutiny, 
thus incurring the penalty of death (Gen. 3: 11-13, 16-18 and especially 3:19; civ. Dei 11.1). 
The pattern is repeated throughout Genesis, with individuals
23
, whole nations and all 
humankind, in the case of the Great Deluge
24
. Indeed, as one moves through the stages of 
                                                          
20
 The Old Testament historical and prophetic books record the exiles of the Northern kingdom of 
Israel in 722 BC (2 Kings 17) by the Assyrians, and then the Southern kingdom of Judah in 586 BC (2 
Kings 23:36-25:21) by the Babylonians, after their kings “do evil in the sight of the LORD”. The exile 
and the destruction of the temple are presented as the penalty for disdaining God’s rule and pursuing 
earthly politics and idolatry. 
21
 See also Van Oort (1991: 94), who, drawing on Augustine’s earlier works, posits that Augustine 
had had this arrangement in mind for a long time.  
22
 God creates everything and puts boundaries for right living in place (Gen. 2). Adam and Eve grasp 
at God’s authority to know (and determine) good and evil (Gen. 3:4) and, along with the serpent – the 
tempter and catalyst to their rebellion – are punished (Gen. 3:14-24). They are sentenced to hard 
labour, are exiled from Eden and are denied access to the tree of life and immortality. 
23
 E.g. Cain: Gen. 4 records how Cain showed contempt for God and His word, by ignoring God’s 
admonishments and determining to end his brother’s life (Gen. 4:2-8). As in Eden, the transgression is 
met with punishment, this time, of restlessness and fruitless labour (Gen. 4:10-16).  
24
 The well-known accounts of the Great Deluge (Gen. 6:5-8:19) and of the cities of  Sodom and 
Gomorrah (Gen. 18: 19-19: 29) are better-known examples in which God judged the wickedness of 
humankind to have spiralled beyond redemption and pronounced the judgement He deemed fitting to 
their crimes. 
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human history according to Augustine, the establishment of law and the pattern of 
transgression and punishment are key factors.
25
 
This pattern of dealing out punishment for transgression, however, is not the only sense in 
which the Bible uses the language of judgement; it should not even be considered to be its 
primary meaning. By disregarding God’s rule, essentially individuals and nations are shown 
to have disregarded God’s judgement, as the verb often used by biblical writers, translated in 
terms of judgement, is “to rule/govern” and in so doing, to restore justice where it has been 
lost (Clifford and Anatolios 2005: 745). All other functions of God’s judgment flow out of 
this and in Augustine’s City of God, it is submission to and rejection of God’s rule/judgement 
that – in a legal sense – distinguish the two cities from one another (civ. Dei 14.3).26 For this 
reason, the nature of justice as determined by God will be the primary focus of this chapter. 
Returning to the examples given of human transgression against God’s primary judgement, 
actual guilt is only one aspect of human culpability before God the law-giver and judge. 
Indeed, a much-debated doctrine is that of original sin or, as Grudem (1994:  496) has 
helpfully termed it, “inherited corruption”. According to this doctrine, the generations 
succeeding Adam and Eve share in a now-perverted nature (Ps. 51: 5; Eph. 2: 3; civ. Dei 
14.1). For Augustine, this corruption is rooted in an understanding of the Genesis account as 
historical, and that the corrupt nature is passed down through the generations succeeding 
Adam biologically (Rigby 1999: 611). Furthermore, as Rigby (1999: 610) reads Augustine’s 
extensive writing on the subject, he notes that Original Sin (inherited corruption) is bound up 
with pride and the hatred of God. These two concepts, as will be discussed in Chapter 4 
below, are central to understanding the City of Man and the justice of God and His 
judgements, according to Augustine. 
 In addition to inherited corruption and closely related to it
27
, biblical teaching regarding 
human failure to conform to the moral law of God also includes a doctrine of inherited guilt, 
                                                          
25
 At every stage, God (re-)establishes order, law or covenant, often in reaction to wilful human 
failure to uphold His standards. As this thesis will show, Augustine sees only the coming of Christ 
and His return at the end of time as the final and definitive resolution of the cycle.   
26
 This is further discussed in 4.1.1. below. 
27
 So closely related are these notions of inherited corruption and imputed guilt, that Augustine does 
not seem to separate it. Indeed, in civ. Dei 14.1, it seems that it is corrupt human nature that incurs 
God’s wrath and punishment. This reading is objectionable, however, for the corruption of human 
nature is essentially the explanation given by Augustine for the hostile stance of humankind towards 
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or more accurately, imputed guilt. According to this doctrine, the guilt incurred by Adam has 
been transferred by God to all who come after Adam. This is the natural implication of the 
notion that God “regards the human race as an organic whole, a unity, represented by Adam 
as its head” (Grudem 1994: 495-496; Rom. 5: 12, 18-19a).  
Whether both or only one of these explanations for the repeated failure of humankind to 
attain to God’s standard of justice is accepted, all are guilty. Thus, according to the precedent 
of Genesis 3, all deserve the penalty of a frustrated existence
28
 and mortality; a penalty which 
God’s justice demands. 
However, God’s role as the supreme judicial authority is not so one-dimensional that He only 
deals out punishment. He is also presented as rewarding right (just) character and conduct 
with blessing. Indeed this principle is foundational to Augustine’s doctrine of the two cities29 
and lay at the heart of the outcry from Christians in the wake of Rome’s sacking. 
This expression of God’s justice brings us to another aspect of His character, namely His 
mercy. In light of the doctrines of imputed guilt and inherited corruption, all humankind finds 
itself at the mercy of God and, by rights, nobody deserves blessing. When it is said that God 
will have mercy on the pure and upright, or give grace to the humble, it must not be forgotten 
that mercy (or grace), by its very nature, cannot be earned; mercy presupposes punishable 
transgression or some other form of vulnerability and dependence on another’s will. That 
mercy is synonymous with the Lord as He revealed himself to Moses, is the cornerstone of the 
faith of the Jews and, more importantly to this discussion, to Christianity, the faith which 
Augustine sought to defend. It is fair to say that the rest of the Bible’s stance on God’s 
merciful character is rooted in the well-known account of God’s revelation of Himself to 
Moses at Sinai: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
God and specific “instances” of the rejection of God’s law and judgement (rule). Yet, all humankind 
is held legally responsible for Adam’s transgression, for all share in the penalty of death. 
28
 E.g. Rom. 8:18-22 describes creation as in the bonds of frustration and “futility”, “groaning 
together in the pains of childbirth”. This is the state into which it was thrown when Adam sinned 
(Gen. 3:17-19; Schreiner 2008: 2171). 
29
 From the very outset (civ. Dei preface), Augustine states his belief in the principle that God resists 
the proud, but gives grace to the humble. This reference to Prov. 3:34 (also Jas 4:6 and 1 Pet. 5:5) 
appears numerous times throughout the City of God. 
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And [God] said, “I will make all my goodness pass before you and will proclaim 
before you my name ‘The LORD.’ And I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, 
and will show mercy on whom I will show mercy.” (Ex. 33:19)  
6
The LORD passed before [Moses] and proclaimed, “The LORD, the LORD, a God 
merciful and gracious, slow to anger, and abounding in steadfast love and 
faithfulness, 
7
keeping steadfast love for thousands forgiving iniquity and transgression 
and sin, but who will by no means clear the guilty, visiting the iniquity of the fathers 
on the children and the children’s children, to the third and fourth generation. (Ex. 
34:6-7) 
The excerpt from Exodus 33 shows that God determines the extent of his mercy as he 
pleases; God determines the bounds of justice. That this is not a hint at precariousness is seen 
in Exodus 34, where God’s mercy is shown to be bound to his steadfast love and faithfulness 
(v. 6). In addition, this steadfast love and mercy are not incongruous with the employment of 
the legal currency explained above. 
It may be asked, however, “How do these two aspects of God’s character co-exist in the 
Bible? How is it that God is able to show mercy to those who would be delivered into the 
hands of their inherited sinful nature, without violating His own standards of justice?” 
Although it may seem a redundant turn in light of the assertion that God is the very author of 
justice, the question will become important to this thesis if Augustine, famed for presenting 
God as Love, is to be proved successful in defending God’s justice. One way of answering 
this question, is to turn to the rest of the events at Sinai and then to the New Testament, i.e. to 
the giving of the Mosaic Law – God’s formal legal code – and to the Incarnation and work of 
Christ
30
.  
In their overview of possible models with which to read and understand biblical soteriology, 
Clifford and Anatolios (2005: 763) categorise Augustine as holding to a “sapiential” model. 
Essentially, this soteriological model – as well as their “prophetic” and “liturgical” models – 
                                                          
30
 “The incarnation and work of Christ” is used here as shorthand for the biblical interpretation of the 
canonical accounts of Jesus’ birth, life, death and resurrection for the rest of this section. One of the 
plainest summaries is 1 Tim. 1:15: “The saying is trustworthy and deserving of full acceptance, that 
Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners […].” The workings of this claim are manifold, but 
include the imputation of human sin to Jesus, who was perfectly just – the natural implication of His 
divinity (see John 1:1-5, 20:28; Rom. 9:5; Titus 2:13) – but incurred penalty of death as a result (Is. 
53:5), as well as the subsequent imputation of Christ’s justice (righteousness) to corrupt humans. 
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seek to show certain biblical patterns in God’s salvific work (Clifford and Anatolios 2005: 
740-741). The sapiential model specifically emphasises the knowledge of God by revelation 
of some sort, be it through the making of a covenant, the giving of law, or personification or 
incarnation (Clifford and Anatolios 2005: 763). Wisdom in biblical literature, most especially 
in the Old Testament, is decidedly practical, enabling one to please God, on account of it 
being a gift from God to that end (Clifford and Anatolios 2005: 760). Indeed knowledge of 
God (illumination) is tantamount to salvation (Clifford and Anatolios 2005: 739 and 763).   
Both Christ and the Law give content to what biblical Wisdom literature calls the “fear of the 
LORD”, which is essentially submission to God’s kingship. They may be understood as the 
vehicles of God’s mercy, for they are the Old and New Testament revelation of His standard 
of righteousness and what it takes to attain it (Deut. 6:24-25; Rom. 3:24-25). In the Law and 
in Christ, God reveals the truth about human sinfulness, instead of allowing humanity to 
wallow in damning pride (Clifford and Anatolios 2005: 765). The means by which a 
transgressor grasps hold of righteousness, then, is by faith (Rom. 3:21-31). Indeed, the writer 
of the book of Hebrews states that the faith that has always made God’s people righteous – 
even before the giving of the Law, in the case of Abraham (Gen. 15:6; Rom. 4:3) and the 
other patriarchs – also helps them to understand God’s Word and works, and helps them to 
live rightly (Heb. 11-12:2). In return, the faithful wo/man is restored to blamelessness, and 
enjoys God’s forgiveness (mercy), blessing, unswerving love and faithfulness in this life 
(Prov. 3:5-6; Hos. 14; 2 Sam. 22:21-31). 
Although Augustine affirms all of this throughout the City of God, he is also radical in his 
Christocentric hermeneutic and so, with Christ as the manifestation of wisdom, it is by faith 
in Christ or the mystery of His incarnation that people are saved to become the people of 
God, both in the historical periods before and after the Incarnation (civ. Dei 10.25). Prior 
revelation (e.g. in the Law) simply pointed ahead to God’s self-presentation in Christ, who 
was to present the fact of human sinfulness in a definitively saving way (Clifford and 
Anatolios 2005: 765). 
In the final analysis, a biblical stance of God as the author of justice and its outworking starts, 
for Augustine, with the Gen. 1-2 account of Creation. God’s judgement (rule) is legitimated 
by His authorship. However, starting with the primal human pair, humankind rebelled against 
God’s rule, incurring guilt both by the corruption of human nature and by the imputation of 
guilt by God. The penalty for this rebellion is death and a frustrated earthly existence. As the 
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biblical narrative is followed, the possibility of justification within God’s legal system is 
revealed. The principle is that of God punishing wrongdoing (injustices) and rewarding just 
conduct, with the Mosaic Law and the Incarnation and work of Christ giving content to life 
acceptable to God. 
The life accepted by God as just and so earning His pardon and reward, according to the 
elucidating work of Clifford and Anatolios (2005), may be described in terms of a model of 
salvation emphasising Wisdom. As such, Augustine’s own interpretation of Christian 
salvation may be looked at and described in terms of this sapiential model. According to this 
model, justification is made possible, ultimately, by God’s gracious (merciful) revelation of 
His wisdom and Himself in Christ. This mercy is meant to be taken hold of by faith. 
Although the principle of punishment for wrongdoing and reward for just conduct was 
undoubtedly accepted by Augustine’s pagan detractors as an expression of the classical 
model of justice as giving each their due, the bounds set by God and His condition for 
justification were a stumbling block for them. At a most basic and obvious level, this is 
because it leaves them in the camp of the damned. Even if this implication were accepted by 
the pagans – as was undoubtedly Augustine’s hope – the step of faith was an enormous 
obstacle. In 2.1.2 above, it was stated that sophisticated Platonism pervaded the philosophical 
landscape. According to this system, God is entirely other and unknowable, while knowledge 
of the Nous (which encompasses Reason/logos and Wisdom) is knowable by the souls to 
which it gave rise. Wisdom is completely abstract, and considered by Platonists to be on a 
plane much higher than profane humanity. That God should have “stooped” to reveal both 
Wisdom and Himself through Christ’s Incarnation was unthinkable to Augustine’s Platonic 
opponents (Clifford and Anatolios 2005: 763-764). Nevertheless, Augustine argues for the 
verity of his worldview using every rhetorical tool at his disposal, including a common 
understanding of what justice ought to be. 
One way of winning over his opponents was to show them what the positive, practical 
implications of this Christian perspective might be. This he does in the City of God, as will be 
discussed in 4.2.1.ii below. The following section (3.2.2) offers some technical background 
on what Augustine has to say in the final books of the City of God. 
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3.2.2. Biblical Justice in Action 
When considering the practical implications for a view of justice like the one explored above, 
the temptation may be to look at descriptions of praiseworthy actions or to extract principles 
from these. A study of that kind would, however, require tomes of its own, not least because 
of the diversity of cultures in the Bible itself. A viable alternative is to look at the words used 
by biblical writers to describe just living and conduct, particularly because of the cultural 
weight and nuances acquired by words as they are used.  
Unfortunately, the nuances are often lost in translation. For this very reason, it was 
Augustine’s view that, whenever possible, one ought to study texts in the original languages 
to gain the best possible, unmediated understanding of a given text (Williams 2001: 68). This 
is sensible advice that has the potential for yielding interesting results. This section, therefore, 
will begin with a look at two important words used to express aspects of justice in Old 
Testament ethics, viz. mishpat and tzadeqah
31
, in order to expand on what has been 
discovered thus far. Of course, this course of action is somewhat problematic, as Augustine 
did not know any Hebrew and knew Scripture chiefly in Latin (Williams 2001: 70n8). 
Despite the discrepancy between Augustine’s precept and practice, however, the principle is a 
sound one and will be taken seriously here. 
Old Testament scholars point out that the first word, mishpat, occurs over 200 times in its 
various forms throughout the Old Testament (Keller 2010: 3), indicating that it is a central 
concept for understanding the biblical view on justice. A concept that is often paired with 
justice (mishpat) in Scripture is that of righteousness, rectitude or “being just” (tzadeqah). In 
fact the two are so narrowly related that it is difficult to draw sharp distinction between them.  
Mishpat is most often translated as “justice” in the forensic, retributive (rectifying)32 sense 
and is, as such, a means to maintaining a state of a society
33
 (Wolterstorff 2008: 73-74; 
Clifford and Anatolios 2005: 745). It also has a distributive thrust (Wolterstorff 2008: 69-70) 
                                                          
31
 Septuagint and New Testament equivalents: krisis and dikaiosune respectively, although translators 
of the Hebrew Bible into Greek did not necessarily hold so rigidly to these (Wolterstorff 2008: 112). 
For the sake of brevity, it has been decided to concentrate almost solely on discussions regarding the 
Hebrew, and so get to grips with concepts themselves, by means of analysis of chosen representative 
signifiers.  
32
 Expressed as juridical judgements. 
33
 What Wolterstorff (2008) terms “primary justice” throughout his book, Justice: rights and wrongs. 
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and so, one might say that it denotes equitable treatment under the law regardless of 
individual social standing (e.g. Lev. 24: 22
34
). In addition, mishpat includes giving each 
her/his due, with the latter sense being used both of the wage due to the Levite priests paid by 
the other tribes (Deut. 18: 3), and of the care due to the vulnerable (Prov. 31: 9) (Keller 2010: 
3-4; Wolterstorff 2008: 73). 
This way of life was meant to maintain right relationships and order. The notion of “being 
just” or “being righteous” in this way is what is known as tzadeqah (Motyer 1993: 471). 
Scholars, such as Oliver O’Donovan and Walter Brueggemann35 (cited in Wolterstorff 2008: 
68-78), differ on which aspect ought to be emphasized, but it is not disputed that the faithful 
should strive toward maintaining a just state of affairs, through just distribution of property 
(ensuring that individuals and groups are given their due, that their needs are met), and 
through the rectification of breakdowns in justice (retribution for wrongdoing).  
Christopher Wright has expressed this biblical justice in terms of mishpat being that which 
“needs to be done in a given situation if people and circumstances are to be restored to 
conformity with tzadeqah” (cited in Keller, 2010: 195n27). These ideals, in turn, reveal 
something of the character of the God who was shown in the previous section to determine 
justice and its bounds and expression. In this line, it may be said that the God of the Bible 
consistently values the equitable treatment of people, both with regard to their needs being 
met and under the law, and demands this also of His people (Deut. 1:16-17; Jas 2:1-13). The 
display of justice thus becomes a matter both of obedience and emulating God’s character.  
                                                          
34
 Here, Israel is exhorted to have the same mishpat (“rule of Law”) for the foreigner and the native. 
35
 O’ Donovan thinks of mishpat primarily as “judicial activity” (rectifying or retributive justice) as 
opposed to a state of affairs, in which property is justly distributed (what Wolterstorff calls “primary 
justice” throughout his book).  The central thesis of O’Donovan’s The Desire of the Nations is 
discussed by Wolterstorff as the sharpest challenge to his own interpretation of the Old Testament 
writers on justice (Wolterstorff 2008: 68-75). Wolterstorff affirms O’Donovan, but would perhaps 
play down his emphasis on action somewhat, in favour of justice defined in terms of rights. 
Brueggemann, also discussed by Wolterstorff (2008: 77-78), is represented as ‘over-emphasising’ the 
converse aspect of Old Testament justice. Wolterstorff (2008: 78) quotes Brueggemann: “[…] both 
distributive justice and retributive justice can find warrant in the text of Israel, [but…] it seems 
unambiguous… that in Israel’s core texts related to the Mosaic revolution, Yahwism is a practice of 
distributive justice.” This is softened by Wolterstorff, whose inclusive approach has been opted for 
here.  
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In conclusion, God’s justice and right judgement, although rightly understood in terms of 
transgression and punishment, as presented in Chapter 3.2.1 above, cannot be confined to 
mental activity or the legal sphere. Dispensing this justice is two-fold, as He establishes His 
chosen order (just order) in the world and intervenes in unjust situations, bringing them back 
in line with His divine will (Clifford and Anatolios 2005: 745).  
This last, practical aspect of biblical jurisprudence is of critical importance to Augustine’s 
arguments in the City of God. Equitable treatment of all members of society was an ideal 
accentuated in the secular judicial code of Rome. Indeed, as Augustine argues his case for 
Christianity, he takes it as an undisputed given that justice is to “give to each his due” (civ. 
Dei 19.4). Moreover, he expects his readers to be grieved by breakdowns in this process, 
regardless of their religious confession. 
In the following chapter, it will be shown that Augustine valuates striving after mishpat and 
perfect tzadeqah within the bounds of justice set by God higher than keeping earthly laws for 
their own sake. This he does by showing up faults in the most basic fibres of secular society 
and its morality, while expounding his understanding of the “superior way” of pledging 
allegiance to the truly just City of God. 
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Chapter 4: Justice and the City of God 
4.1. The City of God 
Before any attempt can be made to present Augustine’s understanding of the concept of 
justice as expressed in the City of God, it is necessary to consider this, the definitive work of 
his maturity, more generally.  
First, there is the question of how to handle the length and nature of the work. As noted in 
chapter 1.2 above, the City of God ought not to be seen as a purely occasional work. For 
although Augustine expressly says that with it he intends to answer the adversaries of the 
church, he had long busied himself with the theory of the two cities. This is clear from the 
fact that it touches on many more issues than will have been necessary to answer the 
accusations of the detractors mentioned by him in the preface to the City of God. Regarding 
the role of the events of 410, J-C. Guy (cited by Van Oort 1991: 86n379) writes that the 
fateful day was by no means the cause, but rather the opportunity for Augustine’s long-
pondered reflections to come to the fore. This has led many commentators, such as Van Oort 
(1991: 88), to assert that the City of God be seen as a compendium of Augustine’s most 
developed thought. Whether or not one chooses to accept this position, it does highlight the 
importance of narrowing one’s focus if anything meaningful is to be said within the 
constraints of length in a thesis of this kind. The following discussion, therefore, will refer 
mainly to Books 19-22, with reference to excerpts from the rest of the work and a few of his 
other writings. Of course, while narrowing the focus of the discussion, it is essential that the 
place of Books 19-22 within the rest of the work – i.e. its place in the argument as a whole – 
be understood. Thus, following explanatory comments made by Augustine himself in his 
Retractationes (cited in Evans 2003: xxxiii) and a letter to the layman Firmus
36
, a breakdown 
of the City of God now follows. 
4.1.1. Brief outline of Contents 
The City of God may be divided into two principle parts, with the first part of the work 
comprising Books 1-10 and the second, Books 11-22. In the first part, Augustine deals with 
the opinions of his counterparts. He does this using reports of certain events from Rome’s 
                                                          
36
 First noted by Dom C. Lambot and published in 1939 (Bettenson 2003: lxvi). 
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sacking and other incidents in Roman history and mythology
37
 (Books 1, 3, 5, 10), and 
referring to preeminent figures, thinkers and schools of philosophy (Books 2, 4, 6, 8-10), 
some of which have been discussed above.  
One feature of this section, and one that is important throughout this defence of the faith, is 
that Augustine uses that which might be interpreted as the pagan equivalents of the basic 
presuppositions of his own worldview as his point of departure.  Thus, where the Christians 
held the God of the Bible to be the Creator and Sustainer/Helper of creation – something 
implied throughout this first section, but said explicitly in civ. Dei 14.27 – Augustine 
investigates the pagan belief in the gods’ shared responsibility for the upkeep of different 
parts of creation (Books 4, 6 and 7). This he does with a view to building a strong defence in 
the face of the accusations of his opponents. In other words, in order to answer the charge 
that the forced worship of the Christian God at official level, to the detriment of pagan 
religion, was responsible for the sacking of Rome, he paints a picture of Roman religion and 
morality, and challenges it at a level related to that which is familiar to him.   
With a mind steeped in his own Christian ideas, he looks intently at the pagan worldview, and 
points out what he considers to be logical inconsistencies or cracks, as it were, in their 
foundational beliefs. Staying with the example given above, one of the cracks pointed out by 
Augustine, is the idea that every aspect of the human experience and condition – from the 
changing of the seasons, to childbirth and even warfare – is governed both by Jupiter, king of 
the gods, and lesser deities. A significant part of his argument rests on this hierarchical 
organisation of late antique pagan divinity that some recent scholarship has read as a form of 
monotheism
38
 with Jupiter at the helm.
39
 The sheer number of gods governed by Jupiter, he 
                                                          
37
 The term ‘mythology’ is used for the sake of convenience and brevity, as the line between historical 
truth and myth was decidedly less clear than our post-Renaissance sensitivities might have it. This is 
evident even in the way Augustine treats events that have slipped beyond the realm of legend and into 
myth (e.g. the founding of Rome, which Augustine discusses with reference to the stories of Romulus 
and Remus, as well as Aeneas). That is not to say necessarily that Augustine and/or his 
contemporaries considered those things which ‘ought’ to be treated as myth to be true. Instead, the 
distinction between known history and ‘pre-history’ was unimportant. Within the context of 
Augustine’s project, this is probably because Augustine was more concerned with his opponents’ 
psychology and worldview than with the events themselves.  
38
 Introducing a collection of essays presenting monotheism as a central tenet of Pagan religion during 
the fourth and fifth centuries, Stephen Mitchell and Peter van Nuffelen (2010: 1) redefine monotheism 
as “belief in the powers of a unique, supreme divinity, although not necessarily to the exclusion of 
other gods.” As helpful as this is for understanding the nature of fourth- and fifth-century Pagan 
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argues, renders certain deities superfluous, due to the overlapping of some gods’ 
jurisdictions. In turn, this results in confusion within the divine hierarchy, with some deities 
even surpassing their king in responsibility and greatness (civ. Dei 4.10). Of course, although 
this demonstrates something of Augustine’s important apologetic tactic very clearly, it is not 
the only issue which Augustine handles in this fashion, even in this first section of the City of 
God. That Augustine’s references to the gods act as a rhetorical device can hardly be doubted 
for, as Khalos (2010: 169) notes, many of the bizarre, ancient, minor gods taken by 
Augustine from Varro’s writings, will scarcely have been known to the average fifth-century 
Roman pagan. Nevertheless, these suited Augustine’s purpose of dismantling philosophical 
support for pagan polytheism (see Chapter 2.1.2), by drawing out the extreme logical 
consequences of hierarchical organisation of an extensive pantheon, and also set the tone for 
his dealings with other aspects of the faith and accusations levelled by his interlocutors.  
In the second part of the City of God (Books 11-22), Augustine develops his own ‘tale of two 
cities’: the City of Man and the City of God. He does this by looking at three things, namely 
the origins of the two cities (Books 11-14), the development of each city (Books 15-18) and 
their predestined ends (Books 19-22).  
Very important, is that the term “city” should not be understood here in the manner which 
most political philosophers before and after Augustine
40
 have seen it, for neither “city” is 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
theology and its harmonisation with (Neo-) Platonism, and as much as it highlights interesting aspects 
of the polemic between Christianity and Paganism, this redefinition does away with helpful categories 
(tools), making meaningful discussion of the confrontation between faith traditions at the time 
unnecessarily complex (Gasparro 2010: 34-35). 
39
 This hierarchy, though not present in earlier – e.g. Homeric – Pagan theology, was embedded in late 
antique religious understanding, so that divinities ruling in the heavenly realms were necessarily more 
important than those designated to positions on earth and in the Underworld (Cerutti 2010: 17). 
Cerutti (2010: 18) describes the hierarchical arrangement of the gods and states that this kind of 
scheme expresses “not the unity of the divine but rather the uniqueness of the sum of the divine, the 
result of extracting the one from the many, or, if one prefers, of the elevation of the one above the 
many. Thus the many gods are not denied as in a completely monotheistic reckoning, but are 
validated in inferior positions and given the charge of fulfilling compartmentalised roles in mediating 
between the divine and human levels.” 
40
 This does not assume, of course, that Augustine should be seen as a political philosopher at all. As 
Weithman (2001: 234) helpfully points out, it is unlikely that Augustine thought political philosophy 
to be a discipline in its own right, to be distinguished from other areas of philosophy or of political 
enquiry. This is evident in the fact that although he wrote much regarding politics, his remarks almost 
always come to a conclusion that neither he nor we would regard as philosophical. As he treated of 
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purely physical. Instead Augustine thinks on a more cosmic scale, with the cities in question 
characterised not by location, economy, walls and the like, but rather by the relation of the 
wo/men and angels of which they are comprised, to God.
41
 Augustine writes that, at the 
foundation of the City of God, angels were created by God as mutable beings endowed with 
free-will, who employed their will to choose to honour and serve God, thus fulfilling the role 
for which they were created (civ. Dei 12.6). There was another group of angels, however, 
which fell and so foreshadowed the path of man and founded the other city. These angels, led 
by Lucifer, are described as having succumbed to pride and rebelled against God (civ. Dei 
11.33, 12.1, 12.8). Thus began the perversion of good nature – of God’s perfect design – and 
this perversion is, for Augustine, the very essence of evil (civ. Dei 12.3, 19.13). Following the 
pattern established by Lucifer and his guerrilla angels, the first human beings also chose to 
rebel against God, thus asserting their hostile independence from Him. At the heart of this 
rebellion, once more, is pride. This pride is, according to Augustine (civ. Dei 11.13) the very 
beginning of all sin and the vilest perversion of all, for it is the disordered or perverted 
“desire to replace God with oneself” (Cavadini 1999: 679).  
Preaching in 411, Augustine expressed his views most vividly, saying,  
Pride is [...] the origin and cause of all sins. It is what cast down an angel and made him the 
devil. Pride was the cup which on being cast down he gave the Man [...] and persuaded him 
to ignore the law of God, and enjoy his very own power. And how did he persuade him? ‘If 
you eat,’ he said, ‘you will be like gods.’42  He had been made man; he wished to be God. (s. 
340A.1 cited in Cavadini 1999: 680). 
And in the City of God (civ. Dei 14.13) he further explains this perverted will and rejection of 
God as a type of misdirected love. For although humankind was created with and for love of 
God as the “higher changeless Good” (civ. Dei 14.13), all descendents of Adam came to be 
characterised by self-love instead. Indeed, the great difference “that sunders the two cities” of 
which Augustine writes, is that in the City of God “love of God is given first place”, while 
the Earthly City is built on and characterised by love of self (civ. Dei 14.13). This distinction, 
it should soon become clear, is vital for an adequate understanding of justice in the City of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
political matters, he drew extensively on ethics, the philosophy of history, psychology and theology, 
thus leaving only a loose-jointed set of political views, which his readers are left to systematise. 
41
 For an elucidating discussion of the concept of civitas, see Van Oort 1991: 102-108. 
42
 Gen. 3:5. 
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God, as is some understanding of what Augustine means when he writes about love in this 
context.  
Weithman (2001: 235-236) points out that the loves of which Augustine speaks in this 
context are not to be understood only as those “transient motives which explain isolated 
actions” or certain “engrained traits of character that motivate habitual action”, but also as the 
most “fundamental orientations of the members of the two cities.” It is the latter definition 
which is most important to this part of the discussion. In other words, where members of the 
City of God are fundamentally oriented toward God, the members of the Earthly City turn 
inward first, and subjugate all else, including God, to themselves. At the outset of an 
elucidating essay, Eugene TeSelle (1993: 88-89) links these properly directed loves to what 
he identifies as Augustine’s extension of the cuique (“to each”) in the classic definition of 
justice
43
, to include God. Justice is thereby constituted by giving God His due, by loving Him 
and loving all else in due proportion to Him.  
With reference to On Christian Doctrine (1:31), Weithman (2001: 235) notes that Augustine 
also differentiates between two ways of loving, i.e. that of loving something as means to an 
end – “use” – and that of loving something for its own sake – “enjoyment” – because it is 
able to give true happiness and fulfilment.  Taking into account what has been said regarding 
humankind having been created for love of God, along with his famous confession, “our 
hearts find no peace until they rest in You” (Conf. 1.1. trans. Pine-Coffin 1961: 2144), it must 
be concluded that Augustine had in mind that only God is to be loved for His own sake. 
Nothing else is able to confer on humankind the happiness and contentment found in loving 
God. To say, therefore, that the Earthly City is built on misdirected (disordered) love is to 
say, simultaneously, that the members of the Earthly City do not love (“enjoy”) God as they 
                                                          
43A reference to Justinian’s definition of giving to each her/his rights, due or own (“suum cuique 
tribuere”). Refer to 3.1.1. above for more extensive discussion of this definition, and to n15 for the 
original Latin, taken from Justinian’s Digest 1.1.10.  
44
 Since Pine-Coffin’s 1961 translation, a number of updated and improved English translations have 
appeared. Notable versions include the critically acclaimed offerings by Maria Boulding (1997) and 
Henry Chadwick (2009). The translation of inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te, 
rendered by Pine-Coffin as “our hearts find no peace until they rest in You,” has been chosen on 
account of his translation of inquieto, inquietus, as finding no peace. This makes the continuity of 
Augustine’s thought regarding the opposition between peace/rest and disquiet (restlessness or the 
absence of peace) more explicit. The connection is relevant, as the Confessions and City of God both 
tell of the journey from a state of restlessness to one of eternal peace with God, and view [wilful] 
stagnation in the former state as a vain existence. 
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ought, but seek the fulfilment He ought to bring elsewhere, i.e. within themselves and in 
other created things. This is where the City of Man has its roots, how it has always 
functioned, and is precisely what will cause its end.  
The origin of the City of God, however, is somewhat more difficult to pinpoint. It has, as its 
foundation, the immutable will of God (civ. Dei 22.2), the adherence of angels to their ‘good’ 
(God-given) nature (civ. Dei 22.1), and in the case of humankind, the faith of the [true] 
church in Christ Jesus as God (civ. Dei 22.6). Yet if Augustine’s account of the inheritable 
nature of Original Sin, the perversion of the human will, and the resultant stance of enmity 
with God
45
 is accepted, how is it that anyone is able to turn to God in faith? How is it that 
God was able to establish a city characterised by love of Him, when all people are naturally 
oriented away from Him? For Augustine, this is possible only through God’s grace (civ. Dei 
22.22). In line with what Clifford and Anatolios (2005: 763-767) termed the sapiential model 
of Christian soteriology and attributed to Augustine
46
, TeSelle (1993: 89) vividly describes 
the process as “presided over by grace, the love of God going forth to illumine the minds and 
inflame the wills, first of the angels, then of the human family.” 
As Augustine traces the unfolding of God’s eternal plan to call a people to himself, he 
chronicles God’s election of wo/men for His city, starting with Abel and tracing the 
development of the city through Noah, the patriarchs, Israel, Judah, the prophets, and to the 
church
47
, who attain Heavenly citizenship through Christ (Books 15-18)
48
. It is interesting to 
note Augustine’s effort to play up the humanity and imperfection of the biblical figures he 
discusses alongside the sovereignty of God. He does this by repeatedly coming back to the 
                                                          
45
 See 3.2.1 above, where the biblical framework drawn on by Augustine is discussed. 
46
 This model and Augustine’s categorisation under its label is briefly discussed under 3.2 above. 
47
 It is worth noting that although Augustine holds a high view of the church, he does acknowledge 
that there is a mixture of both the elect and reprobate in the visible church (civ. Dei 18.49). 
Ultimately, the elect will only be revealed in full with the final establishment of the City of God, at 
the end of this age (civ. Dei 22). 
48
 That he also occupies himself with numerous calculations based on biblical accounts (including 
accounting for the long lives of the antediluvians and speculation about the age of the earth)  and 
looks into the existence of monsters/giants in the Old Testament is, admittedly, very interesting. These 
issues, however, fall outside of the scope of this thesis. The very same applies to Augustine’s 
allegorical readings of Old Testament narrative – at least at this stage of the discussion – and so, these 
issues are not mentioned or investigated here. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
41 
 
separation of the “children of grace” and the “children of the flesh” (civ. Dei 15.3), as another 
way of referring to the citizens of the Heavenly City and the City of Man respectively. 
Another feature of these chapters
49
 of the City of God is how readily and fluidly Augustine 
relates the principles distilled from his accounts of the ancient biblical figures back to the 
Christian era in which he stands, often through reference to New Testament interpretations of 
the Old Testament passages. This is an indication of the fact that Augustine is always aware 
of his readership as he writes, and his agenda is clear, i.e. to persuade his detractors that his 
proposed alternative to life in the Earthly City holds far more merit than any other worldview 
or religion. By regularly mentioning Christ as the founder of God’s city due to his status as 
the vehicle of grace, moreover, he is also engaged in an evangelistic effort.  In other words, 
Augustine lays bare the claims of the Christian gospel, in the hope that his readers will 
respond in faith and so enjoy the kind of felicity offered exclusively to citizens of the 
Heavenly City. 
The preceding chapters of this thesis have shown, however, that even with the City of God 
manifest on earth, the injustice that so naturally flows out of the pride of the City of Man was 
still rife, and the cause of much woe even within the church
50
. How does Augustine address 
this state of affairs? Books 19-22 provide his answer to questions flowing from observations 
of injustice in a Christian era, for in them he describes the destiny of the two cities. As we 
shall see later on, he claims that the future eradication of injustice and the establishment of 
God’s perfect, eternal justice really ought to inform the beliefs, attitudes and actions of 
people in the present age. This eschatological perspective, it will be contended throughout the 
                                                          
49
 In fact this is characteristic of the entire work. The fact that this section (Books 15-18) and the 
preceding section (Books 11-14) deal mainly with events and figures rooted in contexts far-removed 
from Augustine’s interlocutors and therefore, from the stated aims of the City of God, make it all the 
more noticeable. 
50
 The redeemed have never been exempt from temporal ills. Furthermore, North African Christians 
were divided, despite the differences between Catholic and Donastist Christians not being noticeable 
at the level of core-doctrine. Indeed Donatists were welcomed into the orthodox fold without 
rebaptism, and were able to retain their ranks in church leadership. What set Donatists apart – besides 
the politics that first split them from the Roman church – was a hyper-realised eschatology, by which 
they saw the church as needing to be the pure and spotless bride of Christ now, instead of being 
presented to Him as such at the final judgement. This meant that they put greater emphasis on ritual 
purity (Miles 2008: 80-81). Textual evidence (e.g. Augustine’s ep. 133 and 134) makes it clear that 
relations between these two groups were often strained and sometimes erupted into physical violence. 
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rest of this thesis, is most important for an accurate understanding of Augustine’s thoughts on 
justice. 
From the descriptions above, a few things may be noted concerning the section of the City of 
God that will be drawn on most in the remainder of this chapter: 
First, it is found in the part of the work that does not have as its principal aim a direct answer 
to the main accusations mentioned at the beginning of Book 1. In this section, Augustine 
expounds his cosmic urban theology, his tale of two cities. Furthermore, it is found in the 
specifically eschatological section of the work, so that what is said about justice is tied to its 
own place in the predestined end of the two cities (i.e. its ultimate fulfilment at the end of this 
age and the beginning of Eternity). 
Of course, as one reads through Books 19-22, it is clear that Augustine also makes reference 
to mankind’s striving toward justice and peace, and breakdowns in justice in this age. That 
God’s eternal plan is key to interpreting injustices perpetrated in this age is not surprising. It 
must not be forgotten that Augustine writes as a Christian controversialist, engaged in 
conversation with his direct interlocutors, his earlier self, and other voices of his age 
(Coleman 2000: 313). It is implausible therefore, to imagine that Augustine will have seen his 
roles as a pastor-teacher, evangelist, apologist and writer as divorced from one another, or 
that he was ever not at work in any of these fields, even as he penned the last books of City of 
God. Augustine will have had the perspectives, questions and objections of all to whom he 
ministered
51
 in mind as he decided what to include in his work.  
The City of God will, therefore, be treated as one project throughout this chapter, with the 
two principal sections seen as the two parts of Augustine’s apologetic-evangelistic-pastoral 
goals. Having put forth the basic assumptions of his opponents and worked to chip away at 
them along the way in Books 1-10, Augustine is in a good position to put forward his case for 
Christianity. This is the project of the second part, even as he answers the distressed calls of 
the people, who saw their empire being overrun by barbarians, and who were faced with and 
lived out the hostile relations between pagans and Christians.  The refrain which, as we shall 
                                                          
51
 This use of the term ‘minister’ falls within the holistic view taken of Augustine’s work, and which 
seems to flow most naturally from his patristic Christian worldview. In other words, Augustine will 
have seen himself – primarily – as a servant (“minister”) of God and the gospel. Therefore, he will 
have viewed those he pastored, taught, evangelised, argued with and wrote for, as recipients of some 
service (“ministry”) in line with his service to God. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
43 
 
see, rings out continually as he addresses the concerns of his readers, is that this troubled 
world is only temporary, whereas the City of God will stand forever. 
This reflects the fact that one ought always to expect Augustine’s work to be grounded in 
biblical principles and truth claims, as he has been shown to ground his arguments in these. 
This includes his views on justice as it manifests itself now and as it will be established in the 
City of God. Expressed somewhat differently, it will be asked what justice looks like within 
the Augustinian brand of Christian theism, and what its place in his apologetic enterprise 
might be, i.e. what it is that Augustine believed an understanding of God’s justice could offer 
a disgruntled, fluid and diverse society.    
4.2. Exploration of the Theme of Justice 
4.2.1. Justice and the Supreme Good 
Returning to the question posed at the outset of this thesis now, we turn to explore an 
important idea that shaped Augustine’s conception of justice and its functioning in the two 
cities. As he launches into the final section of the City of God, he sets his own discussion 
within the context of the already ongoing philosophical conversation about the Supreme 
Good and Evil
52
, i.e. those things which, in the final analysis, are respectively desired and 
shunned for their own sakes (civ. Dei 19.1). This ought not to be confused with what was 
discussed in the preceding section of this chapter, in which the two cities discussed by 
Augustine were said to be distinguished by what they love (“enjoy”) for its own sake. Rather, 
it ought to be seen as an expression of each city’s prime reality, a term used by James Sire 
(2009: 22) to denote that which sets the boundaries for all other parts of a given worldview
53
. 
                                                          
52
 Throughout the City of God, as translated by Bettenson (2003), the terms “Supreme Good” and 
“Supreme Good” are used interchangeably. For the sake of clarity and to avoid confusion, this 
concept will only be referred to as the “Supreme Good”. Similarly, “Supreme Evil” / “Supreme Evil” 
will be referred to only as the “Supreme Evil”. 
53
 Worldview is understood here in terms expressed by James Sire (2009: 20), as “a commitment, a 
fundamental orientation of the heart, that can be expressed as a story or in a set of presuppositions 
(assumptions which may be true, partially true or entirely false) which one holds (consciously or 
subconsciously, consistently or inconsistently) about the basic constitution of reality, and that 
provides the foundation on which one lives and moves and has one’s being.” As Sire (2009: 18, 19n4) 
notes, however, worldview analysis has potential for overemphasis of the intellectual cum abstract 
nature of worldview, while ignoring any cultural-historical development. Still, isolation of this frame 
and inclusion of Sire’s vocabulary allows for clarification of and meaningful distinction between 
closely related ideas, as well as for a description of how Augustine’s views are woven together. This 
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This prime reality is to be found in the God of the Bible and in the subjective Self, for the 
inhabitants of the cities of God and man respectively. As that according to which the 
individual and the city orientate life, movement and being, it makes sense that prime reality  
ought to determine the nature of good and evil, and by logical extension, Supreme Good and 
Evil, as the final objects of human desire and aversion. 
 For the intents and purposes of this thesis, the definition, nature and practical implications of 
the Supreme Good and Evil make up what is possibly the most important frame within which 
to view justice. This is because, as was seen in Chapter 3 above, the pervasive understanding 
of justice by Augustine’s day was to give each man his due or right. Justice, then, was 
considered a good, with injustice as its evil corollary. If justice is a good, therefore, its 
essence and functioning are determined by that for the sake of which it is desired. Of course, 
this statement assumes that justice is not the Supreme Good, for which every other good is 
sought. In fact for Augustine, it most certainly is not. 
During his brief discussion of varying opinions regarding the Supreme Good in Book 19, 
Augustine passes judgement on the answers put forward by various philosophers, arguing for 
the rejection of their views. With reference primarily to Varro once more, he distinguishes 
between two main groups of desiderata, i.e. virtue (the “art of the conduct of life” which is 
imparted through teaching) and four natural objects of human desire (pleasure, rest, a 
combination of the two, and the “primary natural blessings”54) (civ. Dei 19.1). Noting the 
various emphases and opinions of different schools of philosophy on these goods, he also lifts 
out Varro’s arguments against philosophers who would subjugate virtue to any of the goods 
in the second group of desiderata. Instead, by Augustine’s account, Varro views the good life 
(the truly happy life) as a “life which enjoys virtue and the other goods of soul and body 
without which virtue cannot exist” (civ. Dei 19.2).  
Augustine’s answer to views such as this, however, is that the human experience is liberally 
peppered with all manner of ills, most of which are related to the breakdown of the natural 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
should make it easier to follow the thread of justice later on in this investigation. For more on this 
worldview analysis framework, refer to Appendix B. 
54
 Although Augustine does not give any concise definition of these “natural blessings” – also known 
as the “primary gifts of nature” by the Stoics (see Bettenson 2003: 844n4, 852) – it becomes clear 
through the development of his argument, that it acts as an umbrella term for wo/man’s physical, 
psychological and emotional well-being. 
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blessings (civ. Dei 19.4). In this regard, he gives the examples of amputation, illness and 
‘enfeeblement’ as despoiling physical health or well-being, in an extensive reference to 
Cicero (civ. Dei  19.4), while insanity and the loss of sense perception are given as examples 
of the despoilment of mental and sensual goods (civ. Dei 19.4). 
A Supreme Good sought in ‘natural blessings’ to any extent then, is susceptible to failure. 
Augustine does not stop at this point, however, for virtue is also no contender for the title. 
This is because he understands the function of virtue to be that of keeping vices in check and 
so, employing ‘the art of living’ (i.e. virtue) is a perpetual battle, with no foreseeable end; 
virtue is not able to confer any kind of peace or joy to be enjoyed for its own sake (civ. Dei 
19.4). Above and beyond this estimation of the value of virtue, Augustine does not count true 
virtue a possibility for any person not in submission to God’s rule (civ. Dei 19.25). Indeed, as 
he makes this point, he argues that the influence of deceptive demons – to whom he gives 
responsibility for pagan belief in the existence of deities other than the God of the Bible – and 
human pride turn every virtuous action into a vice. Only God, Augustine argues, can bring 
about the proper “rule over the body and the vicious propensities” (civ. Dei 19.25). Thus 
one’s ability to practise or exhibit virtue is limited to one’s allegiance, either to the City of 
Man, or of God. 
It is within this context that the virtue of justice is rejected as humankind’s Supreme Good. In 
his consideration of justice and its unsuitability as the Supreme Good, Augustine’s widely 
acknowledged Platonic bent becomes evident as he refers to a tripartite division in the 
constitution of human being (civ. Dei 19.4). Of course, considering his rootedness in his time 
and in a culture which was so well-imbibed in Platonism, as well as the vast contents of his 
ideological toolbox, this should come as no surprise. After the baptism of certain 
characteristic Platonic ideas into the Christian worldview, then, he is able to refer to the 
subordination of the human soul to God, the body to the soul and, therefore, of the whole 
person to God. For him, this is the “just order of nature” at work in the individual, assigning 
to each part its due, and at work between the individual and God, assigning God His due, by 
subordinating every part of one’s being to Him55. Considering Augustine’s belief in the 
inherent corruptness of human nature and its subsequent enmity with itself – i.e. the ‘desires 
of the flesh’ being at odds with the ‘desire of the spirit’ (civ. Dei 19.4 cf. Gal. 5:7) – and 
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 See also 4.2 above, where TeSelle’s (1993: 88) interpretation of Augustine’s just order as the 
expansion of the classical definition of ‘justice’ to include God. 
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rebellion against God, the “just order of nature” is an impossibility. Justice, as it performs its 
function, would seem to be constant labouring instead of “resting after reaching its 
completion” (civ. Dei 19.4).  
This view of justice as a virtue and entertaining the notion of virtue as the Supreme Good are 
examples of Augustine engaging in philosophical debate at its most fundamental level. That 
is to say, he returns to the basic assumptions that preceded the answers of Varro et al, to the 
question of the Supreme Good of humankind. In Book 19.3, Varro is presented as stating 
that, because the Supreme Good sought for by philosophers is the good of humankind
56
, one 
ought to begin by defining what man is, and find that Supreme Good there. Answers included 
that man is either body (which desires physical goods) or soul (as the seat of virtue and 
desirous of abstract goods), or both. Augustine aligns himself with the more holistic view, yet 
cannot locate the Supreme Good within corrupt humankind. For this reason, he seeks the 
Supreme Good in God’s original created order as he understands and interprets it.  
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With reference to the virtue of justice and the just law of nature at work in the individual, it 
has been shown that part of God’s created order is right relation of parts to each other (within 
the whole) and of the whole to God Himself. In fact this is what Augustine called the “just 
order of nature”. Having just seen what that means for the individual in the section above, let 
us look at what Augustine wrote regarding created order at large – as represented by the cities 
of God and of Man – and its relation to the Supreme Good. 
In this regard, it has already been mentioned that the ends of the two cities differ; the 
members of God’s City are bound for eternal life and felicity, while their counterparts look 
forward only to eternal death. This, for Augustine is the key to understanding true Supreme 
Good and Supreme Evil, for as he begins to offer a Christian perspective to the discussion, he 
posits that for the righteous person, “eternal life is the Supreme Good, and eternal death the 
Supreme Evil and that to achieve the one and escape the other, we must live rightly” (civ. Dei 
19.4).  
As his discussion continues, however, it becomes clear that Augustine’s view is hardly so 
one-dimensional as not to account for manifestations of good among the pagans or for the 
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 As opposed to the good of some animal, plant or inanimate object. 
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parts played by the righteous in temporal ills. The keys to understanding the idea of eternal 
life and death as the poles determining ethical (virtuous) conduct, are to remember that these 
are expressed in miniature by the “just order of nature” in the individual and its corruption 
respectively. Elsewhere, then, Augustine posits that it is the eternal peace that will 
characterise life in the City of God upon its final establishment that is to direct the hope and 
virtuous conduct of the Christian, and to be desired for its own sake (civ. Dei 19.11). This 
peace is already part of nature as it was first created however (civ. Dei 19.13), and although it 
has been marred as a result of the Fall in Genesis 3, it is still apparent enough for Augustine 
to recognise and describe it to some degree. For Augustine (civ. Dei 19.13), 
[t]he peace of the body […] is a tempering of the components of the part in 
duly ordered proportion; the peace of the irrational soul is a duly ordered 
repose of the appetites; the peace of the rational soul is the duly ordered 
agreement of cognition and action. The peace of the body and soul is the duly 
ordered life and health of a living creature; peace between mortal man and 
God is an ordered obedience, in faith, in subjection to the everlasting law; 
peace between men is an ordered agreement of mind with mind; the peace of a 
home is the ordered agreement among those who live together about giving 
and obeying orders; the peace of the Heavenly City is a perfectly ordered and 
perfectly harmonious fellowship in the enjoyment of God, and a mutual 
fellowship in God; the peace of the whole universe is the tranquillity of order – 
and order is the arrangement of things equal and unequal in a pattern which 
assigns to each its proper position.
57
  
In a nutshell, then, God – as the prime reality which determines every other aspect of a 
theistic worldview – created the universe and everything within it to exist in orderly rest. If 
this is that good which is to be desired for its own sake, then by logical extension, restlessness 
and disorder must constitute Supreme Evil. As has already been noted above, disorder and 
disordered desire characterise life in the Earthly City.  
Nevertheless, the natural, God-given drive toward peace permeates every aspect of human 
life; that is to say, even the vilest offender against the “everlasting law” of God carries out 
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 This excerpt forms part of the “peace tabulation” (TeSelle 1993: 92), which summarises 
Augustine’s view of ideal peace, as expressed in civ. Dei 19.13-14. See Appendix C for the full 
tabulation. 
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her/his actions with a view to establishing some kind of peace (civ. Dei 19.12). Both the just 
and the unjust naturally strive for peace, although, due to the corruption of created order at the 
Fall, peace in the Earthly City – determined solely by the most dominant Self in a given 
context (civ. Dei 19.17) – is volatile and leads wo/man to determine other goods and evils to 
suit her/himself. Two sterling examples of the workings of this earthly peace are those of the 
family and of warfare.  
Within the context of the family, the paterfamilias seeks to maintain peace through the 
subjugation of all other members of his domestic society to his sole headship (civ. Dei 19.12). 
In and of itself, this reflects a biblical pattern of male headship that Augustine will have 
identified with. The problem with its earthly variant, however, is that where heavenly peace in 
the home entails like-mindedness regarding the giving and obeying of orders (above), the 
household governed by a desire for peace determined solely by the will of its head is marked 
by conflict. Members of that household might be at odds with their paterfamilias and so, fail 
to obey him. In order to establish the desired peace, then, this man might resort to scolding, 
punishment or even what Augustine calls “savage measures” (civ. Dei 19.12). As the 
complete antithesis, Augustine would have the punishment warranted by the disruption of 
peace within a Christian household, characterised by fair proportion and legitimacy, and have 
as its goal the eternal benefit of the offender, keeping her/him from sinning, and deterring 
witnesses of this treatment from doing the same in future (civ. Dei 19.16). In both of these 
cases, the goal is a form of domestic peace. That the means by which this peace is sought 
differ is indicative of men’s allegiances, i.e. of their cosmic political stance. 
 A similar principle applies to war, for the goal of the warlord is to bring the opposing side 
under his dominion, to impose his peace on the other. In this regard Augustine (civ. Dei 
19.12) notes that “peace is  [always] the desired end of war” and “even when men wish a 
present state of peace to be disturbed they do so not because they hate peace, but because they 
desire the present peace to be exchanged for one that suits their wishes.” 
Regardless of these different forms of peace, however, it remains, for Augustine, Supreme 
Good for both the righteous and the unrighteous. This is the point of departure for Augustine 
as he addresses proponents of secular philosophy and places himself squarely within that 
conversation. Its implications for a study of justice are manifold, for it calls into question, not 
only the possibility of justice in the City of Man and the participation therein of the citizens of 
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God’s City in this age, but also casts a bright light on the very justice of God. It is the latter 
which will now be discussed. 
4.2.1. ii)  In Defence of the Justice of God 
Having put forward the theory of the just order of being as straining toward the peace of God, 
with room provided for action straining toward an earthly peace contrary to God’s law, 
Augustine was fully aware that he needed to give an account of how an omnipotent God is 
able to allow the earthly state of affairs and still retain His justice and goodness. 
This problem had plagued generations before Augustine – indeed still plagues many critics of 
monotheistic faith traditions today – and, as was noted at the very outset of this project, also 
plagued many in Augustine’s day. Augustine wrote variously of his living in ‘Christian times’ 
especially between 405 and 415 (Rist 1996: 208)
58
 and although the Christian assumptions 
regarding the place of the empire in Eternity, as propagated by Eusebius, had to be re-
examined and softened by the fourth and fifth centuries, this notion of ‘Christian times’ was 
still widespread. Why, then, had God allowed Rome, the centre of Christendom, to fall to 
barbarians? This was probably the guise of the age-old question of God’s justice in the wake 
of the events of 410. It will also undoubtedly have been asked more broadly (i.e. with 
reference to more than just the sacking of Rome), considering the political, economical and 
cultural flux which affected the empire throughout Late Antiquity. 
To see most clearly how Augustine tackles this question, it is necessary to turn our attention 
away from the final section of the City of God for a moment. In a sermon given in response to 
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 Augustine’s use of the term “Christian times”, although certainly rooted in history and related to 
Eusebius’ idea that Christianised Rome was a continuation of biblical history, is by no means a simple 
case of referred conviction.  His convictions regarding Christianity as it is manifested in space and 
time are rather more nuanced. Rist (1996: 208) summarises Augustine’s understanding and use of 
“Christian times” as an allusion to an era in which pagan philosophy has been superseded (Cons. Ev. 
3.3) or in which paganism was actively suppressed and many heresies put down, under Theodosius 
and his sons. This, though less radical than Eusebius, reflect an idea that Rome was God’s tool in this 
world, to hold up and spread Christianity. A much broader sense in which Augustine used this 
terminology – though not one which would explain Christians’ vexation in the face of temporal woes, 
unless it were on account of a hyper-realised eschatology – is in reference to the entire period between 
the Incarnation and the Second Coming, i.e. that of the Church on earth as prophesied in the Old 
Testament (civ. Dei 18.27-36). 
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the sacking and with reference to the account of Genesis 18: 22-33
59
, Augustine states the 
question as follows: 
So weren’t there fifty just individuals in Rome? The vast number of the faithful, 
all those consecrated women, all those celibates, all those servants and 
handmaids of God – and yet not fifty, not forty, not thirty, not twenty, not ten 
could be found who were just? But if that can’t be believed, then why didn’t 
God spare the city for the sake of those fifty, or even those ten? (exc. urb. 2)
60
 
For Augustine, such questions betray not only an unbelieving heart, but also a 
misunderstanding of God’s dealings with humankind. He also notes (exc. urb. 2) that this line 
of questioning God’s justice is limited, inasmuch as it considers only the human perspective 
and standards of fairness and justice, whereas God will have been looking for people who are 
just by His own transient, divine standards. 
In addition to human and divine standards of justice and fairness being at variance, Mann 
(2001: 44) points out that perspectival prejudices necessarily blind human beings to the 
contribution(s) of some immediate privation of good to the greater good. If one laments the 
demise of some ephemeral thing and desires that it should have lived eternally, it is not that 
thing, but something entirely other (i.e. something not characterised by temporality) that is 
desired (Mann 2001: 45). With reference to Augustine’s On Free Will, Mann continues, we 
fail to see the order and beauty of this “dynamic passage”, analogous with the passage of 
notes and phonemes in the production of music and speech (Mann 2001: 45). 
Returning to the objection raised against God’s justice, it is worth noting that Augustine never 
entirely rejects the possibility that God may well have found righteous (just) individuals in the 
city of Rome. Indeed, in light of his views on the constitution of the Heavenly City, he cannot. 
As was shown above (3.2.1 and 4.1.1), God had identified and chosen the righteous 
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 In Genesis 18, Abraham pleads with God on behalf of the city of Sodom, which God has chosen to 
raze to the ground on account of its pervasive wickedness. During their conversation God is recorded 
as saying, “If I find at Sodom fifty righteous in the city, I will spare the whole place for their sake” 
(Gen. 18: 26) And again, having gone backwards and forwards with Abraham, “For the sake of ten I 
will not destroy it” (Gen. 18: 32). 
60
 Although there are some doubts, the sermon De excidio urbis Romae (On the Sack of the City of 
Rome) appears to be Augustine’s (Fitzgerald 1999: 344). This is the assumption behind the inclusion 
by Atkins and Dodaro (2001:205-214) in their anthology of Augustine’s political writings, from 
which this and other references to the work have been taken. 
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throughout history, imputing justice to His people by grace and through His Son. Thus, 
although not on their own merit, God will undoubtedly have found ten, twenty, fifty or 
possibly more, for the sake of whom He should have spared Rome
61. In light of the city’s 
sacking, how is it that Augustine is still able to cling to the concept of God’s unwavering 
justice? Having affirmed the idea – if only implicitly in this instance – that God rewards just 
behaviour and brings destruction on the unjust, it must be that he interprets the events of 410 
differently to his opponents. 
At the very beginning of the City of God, Augustine makes frequent reference to the mercy of 
the Visigoths on all who took refuge in the city’s basillicae and professed faith in Christ Jesus, 
regardless of the sincerity of their professions (civ. Dei 1.1). Furthermore, he places the 
atrocities committed within the context of the history of warfare (civ. Dei 1.5) with all cruelty 
shown to be within the bounds of convention (civ. Dei 1.7) and, most soberly, never affirms 
that Rome was ever destroyed. The sacking is viewed as a temporal ill; like a corollary to the 
common graces reminiscent of an unfallen world order – e.g. physical wellbeing, civil peace – 
the sacking of Rome was a common affliction, i.e. the deprivation of common graces
62
. And, 
he argues, it was mercy that moved God to moderate the destruction of the unjust as the city 
was being overrun by Alaric’s forces (civ. Dei 1.34). 
The important question for Augustine pertains to what this kind of temporal evil brings about, 
if it is not understood as judgement for some or other wrongdoing. For him, it is the “nature of 
the sufferer, not the nature of the sufferings” that matters most, as affliction and pressure 
serve to highlight both righteousness, in the way of prayer and patient endurance, and 
unrighteousness, expressed in blasphemy and execration of God (civ. Dei 1.8)
63
. Thus, in 
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 See also exc.urb. 5. 
62
 Though Augustine (civ. Dei 1.8.) refers to Matthew 5: 45 – [...] For He makes his sun rise on the 
evil and on the good, and sends rain on the just and the unjust. – as illustrative  of God’s common 
grace, the examples given above serve the intents and purposes of this discussion more effectively. 
Thus the deprivation of physical wellbeing includes sickness and injury, and ultimately extends to 
death (the deprivation of life); in this context, the deprivation of civil peace might include chaos, 
violence, general civil unrest and the like. These ills, all experienced during the sacking of Rome, are 
described and commented on by Augustine in the City of God, Book 1. 
63
 In both the City of God and the sermon on The sacking of the city of Rome. (exc. urb. 3), the 
archetype for suffering despite blamelessness is Job, while his wife is described and the Devil’s own 
feminine accomplice. Having lost all material wealth, his children and his physical wellbeing, Job is 
recorded as never having sinned in what he said or did, acknowledging instead that God not only 
allows temporal sorrows, but also provides every good thing (e.g. Job 1:10). In contrast, his wife 
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answer to the question of the function of suffering, the reasons Augustine gives differ 
according to the standing of the sufferer before God. For the righteous person, such common 
ills are meant to act either as a refining fire or test, while they are meant to drive the 
unrighteous to repentance or make their damnation all the more certain (civ. Dei 1.8). This 
principle appears later in the City of God, if from a different perspective, and is thought of by 
Augustine as one aspect of God’s Natural Law (civ. Dei 19.13). According to this law, the 
individual eventually attains to the nature s/he deserved by her/his free choice, by God’s 
ordinance and despite any disturbances.  
This notion is expressed within the context of Augustine’s description of orderly peace, which 
is the natural, God-ordained goal of all Creation. He chooses, therefore, to view the just and 
unjust actions of the individual and her/his lot within a more cosmic context, giving little 
importance to their synchronic significance and immediate effects, as he defends God’s 
inscrutable justice. Furthermore, he identifies the inclination of all humankind – including its 
redeemed representatives – as that of loving the things (comforts) of this world, even at 
expense of love for the world’s Creator (civ. Dei 1.9). 
Thus, as was seen in 3.2.1 and 4.1.1 above, all people have a penchant for stepping outside of 
the “just natural order” and so, instances of suffering constitute reminders of the fragility of 
earthly peace and the mutability of the objects of wo/man’s misdirected love. These are 
allowed in accordance with the Natural Law and so, are meant to restore that order in a more 
ultimate sense. In other words, temporal ills serve to highlight the consequences of deviation 
from God’s natural order. These consequences, to be sure, do amount to a type of judgement. 
In fact Augustine writes that “it is by God’s deep and just judgement that the life of [...] men 
on this earth is most miserable, [...] full of errors and anxieties” and that “[God] also judges 
the particular actions of individuals performed by the decision of their will” (civ. Dei 20.1). 
This indicates both that God does punish specific wrongdoing or injustice and that, given the 
general misery with which human life is seasoned regardless of individual deeds, this is not 
always the case. Indeed, as we have seen, when the righteous (just) endure seemingly undue 
suffering, it is meant to act as refinement. For much like a parent might discipline a child as 
s/he thinks best, God was understood to discipline His people (children), that their faith might 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
urges him to curse God, so that his suffering might be brought to an end in death (Job 1:9). Job is 
eventually restored, while his wife is left shame-faced. This is a perfect miniature for God’s legal 
economy. 
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be proven and refined, and that they might eventually share in His holiness and perfectly just 
character (exc. urb. 9)
64
. Ultimately, however, Augustine admits to the limits to his 
understanding of the diversity of human fortunes by conceding that God’s “judgements are 
inscrutable and His ways untraceable” (civ. Dei 20.1-2; Rom. 11: 33). His comfort is found in 
the conviction that all that is not understood in this life will be revealed at the Final 
Judgement and understood fully in the life to come (civ. Dei 20.1-2).  
Thus we see that Augustine’s worldview hinges, at least partly, on eschatological sensitivity 
and hope. Of course, although Augustine’s perspective is grounded in Scripture, both his 
experience and the discourse in which he was engaged were bound to his own time and 
location. As a theologian and philosopher, it was his job to interpret this world in light of what 
he understood from Scripture and Christian tradition. What, therefore, were Augustine’s 
views regarding the possibility of justice in the Earthly City, and the participation of God’s 
people therein? This is the next question to be addressed in the pursuit of clarity regarding the 
place of justice in Augustine’s apologetic project.  
4.2.2. Justice in the Earthly City 
4.2.2. i)  The Origin and Nature of Earthly Justice 
Within a context characterised by self-love, the problem of authority is an important hurdle to 
be cleared, before investigating and evaluating the mechanics of justice in the City of Man. 
This is because the point of reference has been decentralised, taken from God and given to 
humanity, necessitating the conception and implementation of some other means to order and 
peace. According to Coleman’s (2000: 317) excellent reading of the City of God and a 
number of Augustine’s other works, trust in another’s authority is “a necessary condition of 
human life in the family and society.”  For Augustine, the shift from the family-oriented 
model of social organisation, as in the age of the Old Testament patriarchs, and pastoral 
expressions of authority and dominion (i.e. rule only over the irrational creatures of the 
earth), to monarchy (i.e. the dominion of man over man) is symptomatic of this state of 
affairs in the face of population growth (civ. Dei 15.1 and 19.15). 
Indeed, Coleman (2000: 322) goes so far as to present Augustine as holding the view that 
political organisation of every earthly kind is a consequence of sin. At first glance it may 
                                                          
64
 See also civ. Dei 1.8 and Heb. 12. 
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seem that this takes Augustine’s negative valuation of the decentralisation of authority too 
far; however it is borne out by observations made in the City of God.  For example, both the 
very first city and Rome itself are said to have been founded on fratricide (civ. Dei 15.5) – 
Cain is said to have founded a city after killing his brother Abel, while the murder of Remus 
by Romulus was an important part of Rome’s founding mythology – and so, the political 
institutions that were subsequently established might be seen as rooted not in justice, but in 
domination by force or the threat of the use thereof (Coleman 2000: 322).  
As noted in the previous section, the order by which that unstable earthly peace is attained, is 
determined by the most dominant self – or selves – to secure her/his own needs, comfort and 
idea of peace (civ. Dei 19.12). Consequently, as Coleman (2000: 333) writes, “every political 
system is constituted by some hierarchy of power, ultimately achieving a shaky peace 
through force when persuasion’s success in instilling plausible beliefs proves to be 
insufficient to achieve the same end.”  
Despite this sorry state of affairs in the Earthly City, however, Augustine does make the point 
that politics and the laws that govern the city are sanctioned by God as a tragic necessity. He 
does this on at least two levels, viz. with reference to this very rootedness in domination by 
force and a platonic notion that the laws that govern human society are pale reflections of 
God’s perfect, just order.  
First, then, how is it that God sanctions any human political system, if it is so deeply rooted 
in human oppression? Augustine’s thoughts on this matter may be found in his brief 
discussion of slavery as the just deserts of sin (civ. Dei 19.15). Starting with a short 
exposition of slavery as the subjugation of man to man “in the condition of bondage,” he 
moves on to assert (with reference to John 8:34) that one who commits sin is effectively a 
slave to sin or to some or other lust. To the possible objection that these comments are 
specifically made in reference to slavery and not politics, an answer lies in the way in which 
slavery is defined, i.e. as human beings bound in subjugation to others. This is simply one 
expression of an inherent human tendency toward forcing one’s own earthly peace on others, 
which is the goal that Augustine ascribes to warfare and other shifts in political power (civ. 
Dei 19.12). In other words, slavery may be viewed as an extreme expression of human beings 
asserting dominance on others of their kind, and each instance as a small-scale example of 
what is expressed, on a grander scale, as worldly politics. 
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Indeed Augustine often explains the whole with extensive reference to its parts. One might 
say that the general penchant of fallen humankind for lording it over those weaker than her-
/himself is expressed in hierarchical social organisation at various levels, earthly politics – in 
its varying manifestations – slotting in at a level which brings the status quo to the surface. 
Slavery, in turn, being a most overt expression of dominance, lifts this aspect of human being 
clear out of the murk, for all to perceive and evaluate. 
Considering the mechanics of the Fall as they are understood by Augustine, when humankind 
originally succumbed to pride and grasped at God’s own power and authority, thus inviting 
God’s judgement on itself, it makes sense that he would declare that “the most pitiless 
domination that devastates the hearts of men, is that exercised by his very lust for 
domination” (civ. Dei 19.15). Of course, this does not directly account for the idea that God 
sanctions worldly politics; it simply iterates somewhat differently the point made by the 
Apostle Paul in Rom. 1:18-32
65
 that God, as an expression of His wrath against those who 
exchanged His rule for their own, handed humankind over “in the lusts of their hearts” (Rom. 
1:24) to “a debased mind to do what ought not to be done” (Rom. 1:28). 
We see, therefore, that humankind is given what it grasped at – in the case of slavery and, by 
extension, political authority – but in the process, becomes subject to the perverted desires of 
the heart. According to Augustine, this punishment should be interpreted in terms of the 
Natural Law which ensures the eventual attainment of divine order and peace, despite any 
disturbances. Indeed “if nothing had been done to contravene the law [of nature],” Augustine 
writes, “there would have been nothing to require the discipline of slavery as a punishment” 
(civ. Dei 19.15). Thus, in virtue of the choice made either to love and submit to the rule of 
God as the Supreme, meaning-giving Good, or to stage a mutiny fuelled by self-love (the 
natural post-Fall tendency of humankind), the individual is either emancipated from bondage 
                                                          
65
 Although Augustine does not make explicit reference to this passage of Scripture at this point, it is 
not unlikely, considering his affinity and great respect for Paul’s New Testament contributions, as 
well as how his thought is imbibed in Biblical teaching, that he will have drawn on the ideas raised by 
Paul in his letter to the Romans. Another concrete Biblical example of God’s sanctioning of human 
politics as a way of handing people over to their ‘sinful desires’ may be found in 1 Samuel 8. 
Although it is not mentioned in Augustine’s own argument, this account does fit the mould he makes. 
In that passage, God sanctions the appointment of a king over Israel upon His people’s request. He 
does this even though their request is an outright rejection of His own kingship (1 Sam. 8:7). The king 
God will give them in response will be a greedy, war-mongering king, under whose yoke the people 
are warned they will suffer. Despite this warning, Israel insists on the instalment of an earthly 
monarch and God gives Saul to them. 
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or continues to face God’s judgement of slavery to the lust for domination and of subjection 
to others’ domination. 
God handing humankind over to its lust for domination, however, is only one aspect of His 
sanctioning human political organisation and the laws which govern it. As has already been 
mentioned, Augustine held that temporal laws could and should be reflective of God’s own, 
perfect, moral law. Of course, this perspective ought to be read within the context of what has 
just been noted regarding political organisation as condemnation.  Rist (1996: 209-210, 215) 
notes that the idea of earthly law imaging God’s eternal moral code is far more prominent and 
strongly held in Augustine’s earlier works and claims that Augustine’s views had softened by 
the time he penned the City of God. He grounds this claim in the conviction that Augustine 
had grown in pessimism through his observations of and interaction with the injustices so rife 
in his context (Rist 1996: 210-214).  
As one reads the City of God, in fact, it is difficult to miss Augustine’s deprecation of life 
under the sun and, more specifically, of Rome’s history as he reads and interprets it. He 
denies any possibility that Rome could have attained to the ideal commonwealth Cicero 
conceived of, i.e. “the weal of the people” (civ. Dei 2.21, 19.21). According to this definition, 
a people is defined as “a multitude united in association by a common sense of right and a 
community of interest” (cited in civ. Dei 2.21, 19.21). If one takes into consideration the long 
tradition into which Augustine slots, and according to which ‘right’ is understood as 
rendering to each her/his due, it is evident that some consensus did exist. This definition, also 
present in biblical literature, came to be the standard by which pagans and Christians alike 
measured just conduct. It had attained the status of assumed universal truth, probably in part 
through the work of Ulpian and Justinian. Despite this consensus, Augustine does not believe 
any ‘state’ to be capable of acting on this. For him, every political constitution is underpinned 
by the misdirected love of self in which every aspect of life in the Earthly City is rooted, 
regardless of any claims to fairness and equity (Coleman 2000: 322). 
If Augustine’s negative valuation of humanity’s ability to live out any consensus of right is 
taken seriously, we must surely ask ourselves how it is possible to speak of, or strive for 
justice at all. The answer lies in Augustine’s views on the natural (i.e. pre-Fall) working of 
the universe instead of humanity’s ‘second’ nature, as well as his Platonic tendencies. With 
reference to both the City of God and On Human Responsibility, Rist (1996: 215) highlights 
Augustine’s claim that “human law could and should be an evident image of divine law”. In 
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other words, God’s law is, for Augustine, the measure of authenticity of laws made and 
enforced in a fallen world. Despite the pervasive perversion of humankind, which makes it 
impossible to attain to perfect justice, earthly laws image their heavenly counterpart to 
varying degrees. It is the work of the Christian to seek to use earthly structures – as far as 
possible – in ways as close as possible to the will of God. In the first place, this responsibility 
falls to bishops and other Christian legal practitioners. Thus, in a letter to Marcellinus, 
brother of Apringius, Augustine urges him to act mercifully toward Donatists convicted of 
murdering one Catholic priest and mutilating another (ep. 133.2, Atkins and Dodaro 2001: 
62): 
Christian judge, fulfil the duties of your devoted father. Condemn injustice without 
forgetting to observe humanity. Do not indulge a thirst to revenge the horrors inflicted 
by sinners, but rather apply a willingness to heal the wounds of sinners. Do not 
abandon the fatherly care that you maintained in the investigation itself. Then you 
dragged from them a confession of their outrages without stretching them on a rack or 
scoring them with hooks, or burning them with flames, but only beating them. […] 
There is a greater need to investigate than to punish; in order to discover who should 
be spared, even the mildest of men will examine a hidden offence thoroughly and with 
urgency. 
It is clear that Augustine has a desire for truth to be exposed and for justice to be done, and 
even encourages the use of coercive force allowed by the law to see these done. Yet, even as 
he advocates this way of conducting an investigation, and even as he urges that the guilty be 
brought to book
66
, he is always concerned for the rehabilitation (salvation) of the guilty party. 
These sentiments are echoed in Augustine’s sorrowful reflection on the workings of the law-
courts and mistakes of human judgement and judges when the truth is more difficult to 
uncover (civ. Dei 19.6). Still, that engagement in these earthly legal procedures is not derided 
must mean that authentic/just laws are sanctioned by God. 
This begs the question: why would a perfectly just God advocate the laws of men opposed to 
Him? Taking a cue from Coleman (2000: 323) once more, it is worth considering what the 
outcome might be if the laws of the Earthly City were treated with indifference or contempt. 
Laws are put in place to maintain order and peace (i.e. that to which all things necessarily 
                                                          
66
 This may be seen as an expression of Augustine’s desire to see God’s ‘legal economy’ (3.2 above) 
manifest in Christian legal proceedings. 
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strive) and so support the Supreme Good. By extension, the absence of law and disregard for 
existent law – both manifestations of lawlessness – would surely cause a descent into chaos. 
Thus, authentic temporal laws inhibit the manifestation of Supreme Evil. At this point, an 
answer to the idea that God also sanctions unjust earthly laws (i.e. laws which go against the 
principle of each person being awarded her/his just desserts), thereby bringing God’s own 
justice back into question, is provided. The accusation holds little water, for God has 
determined the Supreme Good and has ordained that it be desired for its own sake, while 
Supreme Evil is to be avoided. 
The line of argument followed above does, however, raise an important question.  If temporal 
laws do not measure up to God’s eternal moral code (that law which it is meant to image, i.e. 
love of God and love of neighbour), falling so far short as to cause physical, mental, 
emotional and spiritual hardship (e.g. dictatorships, foreign occupation or laws hostile toward 
God’s people), but still manage to maintain a worldly peace, does that not mean that God 
does in fact, stand behind them? At this point it is worth remembering that earthly peace is 
always coupled with some degree of hardship on account of humankind’s sinful over-desires 
(misdirected loves). The fact that a tyrant may come to power and people suffer on account of 
her/his heavy hand does not discount God’s sanctioning of her/his rule. Earthly politics, we 
have seen, is both an expression of God’s grace which provides the authority people need67 
and of His judgement, as he hands people over to their “depraved minds” and lusts 
(specifically the lust for domination). One need only refer to the biblical example of Daniel, 
who Augustine describes as “a man of God, who in captivity confessed to God his own sins 
and the sins of his people, and in devout grief testifies that they are the cause of that captivity” 
(civ. Dei 19.15). 
It has been argued in previous sections, moreover, that the Earthly City is set apart from the 
Heavenly City by its perversion of natural order. Thus, it ought to be expected that no city 
should measure up to the heavenly ideal in this intermediate age. Yet, because “politics [does 
provide] a tolerable social living [by virtue of] man’s final ignorance of who will be saved 
and who will be damned” (Coleman 2000: 323, emphasis is my own), and because Augustine 
believes that reliance on the authority of others is a necessary condition of human life, the 
laws of the Earthly City must be taken seriously and used, ultimately, for the benefit of the 
City of God (civ. Dei 19.26; Coleman 2000: 323). 
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 See Coleman (2000: 322-323). 
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4.2.1. ii)  The City of God “Doing” Justice in the Present Age 
When Augustine advocates the people of God using earthly law to the benefit of the City of 
God during their pilgrimage in this age, he is also echoing the words of the apostle Paul in 1 
Tim. 2: 2; Christians are urged to pray for those in authority, so that they may lead peaceful 
and quiet lives, “godly and dignified in every way.” As Augustine picks up on this idea of 
earthly peace belonging to the righteous and the unrighteous alike as long as it prevails (civ. 
Dei 19.26), he is careful to mention that the people of God ought to take hold of it only in 
light of the eternal peace with God, enjoyed even now through faith (civ. Dei 19.27). Indeed 
this is the resounding refrain throughout the City of God. Augustine describes this life as one 
“of misery, a kind of hell on earth, [from which] there is no liberation save through the grace 
of Christ Jesus our God and our Lord” (civ. Dei 22.22), and therefore it is opposite to the 
felicity and rest to be enjoyed in the Eternal City of God. This view, if carried through to its 
extreme logical consequences, could lead down the slippery slope to reclusive monasticism, 
to Christians shutting themselves off from the world and focussing on their personal 
“holiness” in preparation for the life to come.  
To be sure, Augustine does seem to distinguish between higher and lower orders of 
Christians, with unmarried ascetics outstripping those “tangled in the bonds of marriage” in 
some respects (civ. Dei 1.9). There is, nevertheless, a real sense that the faithful endurance of 
God’s people must extend beyond the private sphere, and that it includes active engagement 
in the life of the Earthly City. This engagement, meant to bring about just order, is what is 
meant by the idea of “doing justice.” The basis for this way of life is the two great 
commandments given in Matt. 22: 37-40, i.e. love of God and love of neighbour as oneself 
(civ. Dei 19.14). Moreover, drawing on Jas. 2:17 and Gal. 5:6, he holds that anyone who 
professes faith, but does not enact that faith through love, possesses only a dead faith (civ. 
Dei 19.27). 
Bearing these directives in mind, it is clear that the peaceful, quiet, godly and dignified life 
Augustine has in mind for the Christian sojourning in the Earthly City, will not entail shutting 
oneself away to pray for those in authority. Instead, the lives of the faithful, while prayerful, 
are also inherently social. The primacy of love of God, who is the primary object and director 
of Christian affections, has already been discussed. Love of God and, by extension, peace 
with God then lead to peace within the individual (civ. Dei 19.14). This is the just, natural 
order, where the individual’s bodily appetites submit to the rational soul, which exists in 
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submission to God (civ. Dei 19.27). The order also extends to wo/men relating peacefully to 
one another as they submit to God’s Law.68 
This begs the question, however, as to how far the exhortation to love one’s neighbour 
extends. Who precisely is this neighbour and how should s/he be loved? Augustine is very 
clear on these points. Within the framework of Roman society, although one’s household 
constituted one’s immediate neighbours, everyone was to be considered a neighbour (civ. Dei 
19.14). Van Bavel (1999: 512) summarises the motives for the love of all humankind as (a) 
that all human beings share in the same human nature, (b) that God commands it, and (c) that 
God is present in them. Whether Christian or non-Christian, righteous or sinner, prostitute, 
stage-player or charioteer, “every human being is the neighbour of every human being” (disc. 
Chr. 3.3. quoted in Van Bavel 1999: 512). On the third point raised, Van Bavel (1999: 513) 
argues from the point of view that in Christ, God identified himself with human beings and 
indeed, clove himself to them.
69
 For Augustine, therefore, God’s presence in all human 
beings – though marred by the Fall stands as the grounds for considering everyone a 
neighbour on account of humankind having been made in His image (Gen. 1: 26-27; Kent 
2001: 214).  
As Augustine goes on, in the City of God, to define what loving one’s neighbour looks like, 
he confirms and bolsters the idea of the extent of love for every neighbour, as the following 
excerpt shows: 
[The one] who loves God is not wrong in loving himself. It follows, therefore, that he 
will be concerned also that his neighbour should love God, since he is told to love his 
neighbour as himself; and the same is true of his concern for […] members of his 
household, and for all other men, so far as is possible. And, for the same end, he will 
wish his neighbour to be concerned for him, if he happens to need that concern. For 
this reason he will be at peace, as far as lies in him, with all men, in that peace among 
men, that ordered harmony; and the basis of this order is the observance of two rules: 
                                                          
68
 See 4.2.1.i. above. 
69
 This is linked to the doctrine of the “the whole Christ”, apparently found in some of Augustine’s 
sermons (s. 25.8.8; 239.6.7) and in the Tractates on 1 John (ep. Jo. 10.3; 20.55). According to this 
idea, because Christ loved all humanity, and free love is seen as a cohesive, even unifying force, all 
human beings are part of Christ. The biblical references given by Van Bavel (1999: 513) in support of 
this include Matt. 25:31-46 and Acts 9:4, which speak about boons and persecutions enacted on Jesus’ 
followers / those belonging to Christ, as having been enacted on Jesus Himself. 
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first, to do no harm to anyone, and, secondly, to help everyone wherever possible. 
(civ. Dei 19.14) 
The neighbour is “all other men” and “everyone.” And, even if only this excerpt is 
considered, loving that neighbour is multi-faceted. First, there is the interesting observation 
that the command of Matt. 22: 39 not only presupposes love of oneself, but positively affirms 
it and has important implications for love of one’s neighbour. At first, this may seem jarring 
on account of Augustine’s view that the Earthly City is rooted in self-love. It is worth noting, 
therefore, that he is not here referring to that very specific and perverse brand of self-love that 
“leads one to arrogate to oneself a place that properly belongs to God” (Kent 2001: 218). For 
Augustine, proper self-love flows directly from love of God and serves as the measure for 
loving one’s neighbour. In turn, love for one’s neighbour is first expressed in the concern 
Augustine expects one will have, that one’s neighbour would love God, the prime, defining 
reality, who alone defines and gives perfect peace.
70
 
Although the practical implications of this concern are not immediately worked out, one need 
only think on the mechanics of justice in the City of God and how it is only through the 
redeeming work of God through Christ, that humankind is justified and gains entrance into 
that fellowship. With this in mind, a distinct evangelistic suggestion emerges. Thus, 
according to this excerpt, the work of telling one’s neighbours about God and labouring 
toward the end that they too might love Him is an important aspect of love for one’s 
neighbour.  
 As a presbyter and bishop, this application will have been especially important for 
Augustine. This is, however, a very narrow application. Another application of this first line 
of reasoning is articulated in the excerpt above, and is more clearly iterated in the 
Confessions (10.4) within the context of Christian fellowship. In this regard, the brethren 
“love in [one another] what they know from [God’s] teaching to be worthy of their love, and 
[…] sorrow to find in [one another] what they know […] to be occasion for remorse.” This is 
picked up on by Wolterstorff, who uses the language of emotional disturbances opposed to 
emotional equanimity and rest.
 71
  He interprets Augustine as saying that “loving oneself in 
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 See 4.2.1 above. 
71
 Thus showing both Augustine’s continuity and break with the Stoics. At this point in Wolterstorff’s 
discussion, he has already posited that Augustine made a clear break with Classical eudaimonism. 
This, Wolterstorff (2004: 180) does well in noting, was provoked by Augustine’s reading of Christian 
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the right way requires […] desiring one’s moral and religious flourishing, the consequences 
of such desire being that one rejoices in success therein and grieves over failure therein” 
(Wolterstorff 2008: 194). Following on this and on earlier reference to the Confessions 10.4 
(Wolterstorff 2008: 193), he then paraphrases the Matt. 22 precept to love one’s neighbour as 
oneself, so that it is seen to express the principle that one’s neighbour’s moral and religious 
condition ought to be as “disturbance-worthy” for us as our own would be (Wolterstorff 
2008: 194)
72
. This way of thinking about loving one’s neighbour permeates the City of God, 
with Augustine looking to the apostle Paul and to Christ, as examples of the righteous 
experiencing emotional disturbances (civ. Dei 14.9). These instances of emotional upheaval, 
for Augustine, are right and just, for they stem from a desire to see all people attain the 
Supreme Good, i.e. eternal peace with God.  
Love of self and neighbour certainly extends beyond concern only for souls, however, as 
Augustine writes about living in “ordered harmony” with every neighbour. This harmony 
consists in doing no harm and helping others where necessary (civ. Dei 19.14). It has already 
been discussed repeatedly and at length that affliction and misery are to be expected during 
this period of coexistence of the Cities of God and Man. It follows, therefore, that human 
relationships are also plagued by conflict, a fact which Augustine thinks through in civ. Dei 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Scripture. Still he is careful to point out those doctrines and methods that are shared with the 
mainstream philosophies that were part of Augustine’s ideological toolbox. In the case of the goal of 
virtuous human being, he begins his discussion with the note that “Augustine shared with the Stoics 
the thesis that rest, tranquillity, freedom from negative emotions, is necessary for happiness. Our goal 
[…] is to ‘attain the things that make us happy and rest in them’ (doc. Chr. 1.3.3).” The Stoic’s aim 
was to avoid extreme emotion and its accompanying discomfort as far as was possible. That is not to 
say that the Stoics did not mean for wo/man to feel any emotion whatsoever; their goal was simply to 
bring emotion in line, to overcome it and live in peaceful equanimity and contentment (see Seneca 
Ep.9; trans. Campbell 2004: 48; also Wolterstorff 2004: 194n18). On the surface, this goal seems akin 
to Augustine’s own beliefs regarding wise living. Unlike the Stoics, however, who sought to avoid 
undue emotional disturbance altogether, Augustine allows for emotional disturbance, if it is line with 
God’s reactions to human conduct (e.g. being grieved by sin).  
72
 Wolterstorff (2008: 180-181) says “Augustine shared with the Stoics the thesis that rest, 
tranquillity, freedom from negative emotions, is necessary for happiness. Our goal, he says, is to 
‘attain the things that make us happy and rest in them (doc. Chr. 1.3.3.). His view as to how 
tranquillity is to be achieved was strikingly different from that of the Stoics, however, and closer to 
the views of the Neo-Platonists. […]Augustine insists that the way to achieve tranquillity is instead 
never to put one’s emotional life at the mercy of that which can fail one. And where the Stoics said 
that we put our emotional lives at the mercy of something when we judge it to be good, Augustine 
says that we do so when we love it. […] So if tranquillity is what you want, love only that which 
cannot fail you […]’” 
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19.5. Yet he exhorts Christians to live peaceably, by doing good. This is not an attempt to 
have heaven realised on earth, for Augustine is constantly aware of the impossibility thereof, 
as his scathing words for the proponents of such hyper-realised eschatology confirm (civ. Dei 
20.17)
73
. 
Furthermore, he holds to the perspective that both the troubles and goods experienced in this 
life are insignificant in comparison to those in the life (and “eternal death”) hereafter. 
Eternity remains his primary concern; still he considers it the work of the people of God to 
provide consolation to the afflicted in this life (civ. Dei 22.22). Not only is it the 
responsibility of God’s people to seek to do good, Augustine also makes it clear that the same 
empathetic love that guides Christian concern for one’s neighbours’ souls should fuel concern 
for the physical well-being of one’s friends (civ. Dei 19.874).  
Interestingly, Augustine blurs the lines between God and His ministers of “holy things,” 
writing that the alleviations “administered […] by holy men” are neither granted only to the 
faithful, nor to all who ask (civ. Dei 22.22). The implication, of course, is that God grants 
good things to people regardless of their relationship to Him (known as common grace), and 
that He uses His people to bring about these good things. Again, this becomes a question of 
Christian responsibility and action in line with God’s priorities, a notion that Augustine will 
have taken straight out of the Bible: “He has told you, O man, what is good, and what does 
the Lord require of you but to do justice, and to love kindness
75
, and to walk humbly with 
your God?” (Micah 6:8). In the words of Kent (2001: 215), moreover, “[A]ll true virtues are 
forms of love rooted in charity, the love of God and neighbour commanded by Christ, virtues 
are by their very nature other-regarding.” 
                                                          
73
 With the usual emotive flair, Augustine writes, in response to any interpretations of such passages 
as Rev. 21:4 that would have the perfect felicity of the saints made reality in this age: “[…] who could 
be so absurd, so crazed with love for perverse argument, as to have the hardihood to maintain that in 
the midst of the troubles of the mortal state [the faithful have] no tears and no sorrows in this life?” 
74
 “[…we are] troubled and anxious because [our friends] may be afflicted by famine, war, disease, or 
captivity, fearing that in slavery they may suffer evils beyond our powers of imagination […]. And 
when such things do happen (and the more numerous our friends, the more often they happen) and the 
news is brought to our ears, who, except one who has this experience, can be aware of the burning 
sorrow that ravages our hearts? Certainly we would rather hear that our friends were dead, although 
this also we could not hear without grief.” 
75
 NIV: “… to love mercy…” 
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Doing justice in this age is not an end in itself, however. As emphasised throughout the 
foregoing discussion, the framework within which Augustine iterates these ideas on temporal 
justice, is grounded in his apocalyptic theology. Thus everything that has happened since the 
beginning of creation – the entire antediluvian era, followed by the ages of the Patriarchs, 
Moses, the Judges, the Kings of Israel and Judah, the Prophets, and Christ’s incarnation, 
death, resurrection and ascension – and all that occurs in the present age, strain toward the 
end of time and the final establishment of the City of God. In that day, Augustine (civ. Dei 
19.16) believes, all injustice will disappear and all human lordship and power will be finally 
annihilated, and God will be all in all.
76
  
4.2.3. Justice as it is in Heaven 
Even as Augustine’s eschatology is considered, it must be noted that it cannot, indeed it must 
not be thought of as independent of what has come before, for God’s Natural Law comes to 
its full expression and fulfilment in this context. Thus we do well to remember Augustine’s 
assertion that the individual attains to the nature s/he deserves by her/his free choices and life 
before the establishment of God’s eternal peace. Those who, in this life, are aligned with God 
and so live truly virtuous lives, look forward to the perfection of their holy and just natures; 
those who now align themselves with the City of Man, ignoring God’s standards of virtue, 
are deprived of true virtue, and so attain to perfect perversion.  
Although the virtue of the faithful is seen as a gift from God (Kent 2001: 215), there is never 
any doubt in the City of God that people will be held responsible for their conduct and 
choices in this life. This tension between God’s complete sovereignty in building His city and 
human responsibility for the sin that binds the citizens to their Earthly City, is an enormous 
topic. Although it cannot go unacknowledged, for the intents and purposes of this thesis and 
for the sake of brevity, it must be placed between parentheses without being addressed.  
As pivotal as Augustine’s eschatology is for an accurate and coherent picture of his thought 
on justice, however, the fascinating and sometimes speculative detail that he goes into is of 
little to no importance to this study. Thus, brief overviews will be given of Augustine’s 
understanding of the Final Judgement and of how he envisages God’s justice will be 
established in Eternity. 
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 Augustine makes reference here to 1 Corinthians 15: 24, 28. 
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Augustine states the subject of Book 20 to be the Final Judgement, when “Christ is to come 
from heaven to judge both the living and the dead” (civ. Dei 20.1). For him, this is the event 
towards which all human history is working, for it encompasses the ends of both the Cities of 
God and of Man. How long the Final Judgement is set to last is uncertain (civ. Dei 20.1). In 
keeping with biblical convention, however, Augustine employs the language of the “Day of 
the Lord” in reference to the time of the Final Judgement (e.g. civ. Dei 20.1 and 20.2). As 
such, although Augustine handles the event of Christ passing judgement on the living and the 
dead, and the eternal outworking of His judgement separately, it is possible to see the latter, 
not as a separate entity, but as a continuation or extension of the former.  
All of human history will come to an end, by the establishment and subsequent eternal 
enforcement of God’s natural law and order; there will be no new judgements, for they will 
not be necessary, and this is precisely why Augustine calls it the final judgement (civ. Dei 
20.1). If one takes into consideration that biblical use of the word “judge” also encompasses 
the act of ruling, and bears in mind the magnitude of the influence of biblical paradigms on 
Augustine (3.2 above), acknowledgement of this interpretation is legitimated. The Final 
Judgement is seen here, both as a judicial process, as the time when Augustine asserts that 
“Christ will come to judge both the living and the dead” (civ. Dei 20.1), and as the time when 
Christ will rule over creation for all eternity. The Day of the Lord and the ensuing era 
(Eternity) are discussed here together.  
Before delving into any sort of explanation of how this Final Judgement is meant to play out, 
the Natural Law of God must be reiterated here. This law, which one might call an 
Augustinian interpretation and expression of the biblical concept of God rewarding the just 
and punishing lawbreakers, states that the individual eventually attains to the nature s/he 
deserved by her/his free choice, by God’s ordinance and despite any disturbances (4.2.1.ii 
above; civ. Dei 19.13). 
The end of this law, it should come as no surprise, is the Supreme Good (peace) and the 
cessation of chaos, for this is what all human activity strains toward, even during the era 
preceding the Final Judgement (4.2.1.i above). What this means for the citizens of the City of 
God, is that they will attain to God’s own likeness (civ. Dei 20.3) and enjoy perfect felicity 
and a perpetual Sabbath rest and peace (civ. Dei 22.3). For those who in this life chose 
alignment with the City of Man, however, Augustine describes the attainment of utter “vanity” 
or “nothingness” (civ. Dei 20.3), which is a reference to the book of Ecclesiastes and its 
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valuation of earthly existence as vanity. Citizens of the City of Man, therefore, attain to 
perfect, proud worldliness and forfeit eternal peace and felicity, instead receiving death that 
will be everlasting (22.22), which is really another way of expressing eternal punishment (civ. 
Dei 21. 9). 
In addition to these broad outcomes, Augustine also makes the point that God’s people are set 
to rule (judge) the rest of Creation alongside Christ (civ. Dei 20.5 and 20.10). This, no doubt, 
is also a throw-back to God’s natural, created order before the Fall of the angels and of 
humankind.
77
 Peace is to be restored, as God had intended from the beginning. 
Before this all comes to fruition, there are a number of events that Augustine refers to and 
explores. One in particular, namely the resurrection of the dead, is of particular interest to this 
study. Drawing on, among other texts, Paul’s first letter to the Thessalonians, Augustine 
holds to a firm belief in the resurrection of the dead (civ. Dei 20:20; 1 Thess. 4:13-17). 
Explicit statement of this fact is important for two principal reasons, namely that it is a 
logical prerequisite for the establishment of the Natural Law of nature to be enforced and 
eternal justice to be established and, that it is the resurrection of the body and its implications 
which were a stumbling block for the secular philosophies with which Augustine engages in 
the City of God. 
As regards the enforcement of God’s Natural Law, this was defined in 4.2.1 above, with 
reference to civ. Dei 19.13, as the individual eventually attaining to the nature s/he deserves 
by her/his free choice, by God’s ordinance and despite any disturbances in the stage of 
history. It has already been noted what this will look like in terms of the individual’s 
character and essential being, as well as that throwback to created order, by which God’s 
people are completely regenerated into the image of God (Gen. 27), in their capacity as rulers 
of the rest of creation. It should be added, however, that the dead cannot attain to any perfect 
nature as they ought to according to the Natural Law, nor can they be subject to eternal 
suffering. 
On the second point, that the resurrection was a problem to those of Augustine’s detractors 
who espouse a Platonic worldview, he shows that he is aware of their objections by 
answering some of them directly. One such objection is that according to Platonic doctrine, 
earthly bodies would not be able to exist in Heaven (civ. Dei 22.11). As one might expect, 
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Augustine answers this objection, first by showing his understanding of his opponents’ 
perspective on ontology. Having done so, he presents his own worldview, moving in at the 
level of basic presuppositions regarding prime reality. Thus he asserts that “the Platonists’ 
arguments for the classification of the elements by weight cannot set the limits on the power 
of the Almighty God so that he cannot make bodies capable even of a dwelling in the heavens” 
(civ. Dei 22.11; Bovon 2010: 389). 
Closing the gap between body and soul created by Platonic abstraction was an essential part 
of Christian apologetics from the time of Justin Martyr, who devoted much ink and energy to 
that endeavour (Clifford and Anatolios 2005: 763-764). Augustine, however, conceded that 
the only way of avoiding this impasse, was a starting point of faith (Trin. 1.1.1; quoted by 
Clifford and Anatolios 2005: 764). As he answers his detractors in this section of the City of 
God, he does so while presenting that which he believes they ought to have faith in. To be 
sure, this relies on the assumption that they will have accepted other foundational truth claims 
made by Augustine and been won over by his descriptions of the Eternity which awaits those 
who share his worldview, truth claims and descriptions which necessitate the resurrection of 
the unified person.
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Ultimately, for Augustine, the “problem” of the resurrection and eternity is an issue of 
Christological soteriology, with its acceptance dependent on divine revelation. Unlike his 
opponents, he is not too much perturbed about ontological details. Although he does argue 
logically for the possibility of bodily resurrection, using the omnipotence of God as his main 
premise, he also offers an affective argument that belief in Christ’s bodily resurrection 
provides proof of the resurrection of the dead at the Final Judgement (Bovon 2010: 389; civ. 
Dei 22.6-7). Augustine starts at the point of biblical revelation as interprets history and 
ontology in light thereof. 
In the final analysis, although Augustine devotes the last three books of the City of God to the 
matter, the manifestation of justice on Judgement Day and into eternity is rather simple.  
Most importantly for Augustine, the justice of God and His judgements is set to be revealed 
fully, leaving no room for questioning or denial (civ. Dei 20.1-2). In other words, although 
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must precede the second and final resurrection to eternal life (civ. Dei 20.7). This, however, is 
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people are able now to question God’s justice and sovereignty, due to the secret 
(“inscrutable”) nature of God’s judgements at present (civ. 20.1-3), and to deny His rule 
without any perceivable consequences, this is only a temporary arrangement. The current 
order will pass away, but the City of God will stand forever, in perfect justice. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
At the outset of this thesis, three questions were articulated, with a view to understanding 
Augustine’s conception of justice within the context of the discourse of his day. These were 
concerned, first, with how Augustine believed justice to function in the Cities of God and 
Man, second, with what influenced his perspective, and finally, how his views on justice fit 
into his apologetic project. Having sought to understand Augustine’s situational and 
ideological
79
 contexts and, concentrating primarily on Books 19 to 22 of the City of God, 
having explored Augustine’s thought on justice, it is the goal of this concluding chapter to 
present the findings of this investigation. 
First, in terms of justice as it is manifest in the two cities, Augustine, who is perfectly aware 
of the importance of law and justice in the Roman context, holds a pervasively negative view 
of justice in the City of Man throughout the City of God. The City of Man does have an ideal 
of justice, which is meant to be embodied and upheld by the law. In the fifth century, 
throughout the empire, the ideal embedded in the Roman collective consciousness was that 
justice was doing right by others, by rendering to each person their rights, their due, their 
desserts (3.1.1. above). 
Augustine does not dispute this understanding of justice in terms of its accuracy; in fact, it 
falls neatly within his own convictions. Whether this understanding of justice ought to be 
attributed to his birth into Roman-occupied North Africa, or his reading of the Christian 
Scriptures (3.2. and 4.2.1.ii above) is not clear. Considering his late acceptance of the Bible 
as his ultimate authority (1.1 above), it is possible to give primacy to the former, with the 
latter simply affirming his conviction. Most likely, however, Augustine would have preferred 
his convictions to be read conversely. Nevertheless, that “justice is that virtue which gives to 
each one his due” (civ. Dei 19.21), is part of the common ground from which Augustine 
departs as he counters his opponents. 
The fallacy which Augustine identifies through the course of the City of God is that his pagan 
interlocutors had romanticised the secular era and replaced the reality with the ideal. This is 
argued both from his personal experience as a bishop in the law courts (3.1.2. and 4.2.2.i 
above; civ. Dei 19.6) and with reference to Cicero’s definition of a commonwealth (4.2.2.i 
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above; civ. Dei 2.21, 19.21). He expects his opponents to concede that breakdowns in justice 
were prevalent both in Christianised Rome and in the preceding era, to which they cast their 
longing gazes. In fact, Augustine would have his opponents go a step further, for in light of 
his attack on the pagan pantheon earlier in the City of God (4.1.1 above), this ought to have 
been further proof that their gods were either false or impotent. Augustine turns the 
interpretation of Rome’s misfortune as the meting out of pagan divine retributive justice on 
its head. Instead, he presents it as an example of God’s retributive and corrective justice, as 
well as His mercy. This is an important aspect of his defence against the charge that the 
Christianisation of the Roman empire was entirely to blame for both the weakening and 
subsequent sacking of Rome. 
 
For Augustine, however, Rome’s failure to uphold justice is directly linked to its belonging to 
the City of Man. From its very founding, the City of Man has stood at odds with God (4.1.1), 
who Augustine believes, on account of his Christian convictions, to be the author and 
dispenser of true justice (3.2.1 above). As a result, the City of Man must contend with the 
deprivation of perfect goods and a consequent frustrated existence. Although the existence of 
laws and an ideal of justice are indicative of remnants of God’s created order (4.2.2.i above), 
the basis of worldly justice is the misdirected love of self, as opposed to love of God. 
Nevertheless, we are still able to refer to “worldly justice”. To understand this, we must refer 
to Augustine’s view regarding the Supreme Good, as explained in 4.2.1 above. The Supreme 
(Ultimate) Good is, according to the philosophical conversation into which Augustine steps 
with the City of God, that Good for the sake of which, all other goods are sought. It was 
shown that Augustine believes the Supreme Good to be peace (rest). For this reason, the end 
of justice, as a virtue or good, must be peace. To be sure, Augustine does state that peace 
exists in the City of Man. This worldly peace is, however, highly volatile, for it is achieved 
by human beings imposing their wills on one another, often by force.   Heavenly peace, in 
contrast, is constituted in the God-ordained order of the human self in loving submission to 
God’s will. This, in turn, would cause peace to reign within the individual and eventually in 
human society. Augustine refers to this ordered and peaceful relation of the parts of creation 
as the “just order of nature”. 
Returning to the question regarding the place of justice in Augustine’s apologetic project, it 
was stated in Chapter 1.2 that the City of God would be regarded as a unified work, with the 
purpose of answering the accusations of opponents to Christianity by discrediting their 
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worldviews and presenting a Christian worldview as the only viable alternative. This manner 
of argumentation is characteristic of protreptic. As Augustine presents his worldview, he does 
not shy away from those elements which stand at complete odds with his opponents, such as 
the human Incarnation of the logos in Christ (3.2.1) or the resurrection of the dead (4.2.3). 
Instead, he tackles these head-on, often in an aggressive polemical style,
80
 but also continues 
to piece together a picture of what he believes justice ought to look like, both in practical 
terms and with eschatological vision. 
To bring across the practical aspect of Heavenly justice, he allows his hostile interlocutors to 
“eavesdrop”, as he exhorts Christians to live lives that reflect God’s just order, by doing 
justice in the present age (4.2.1.ii above). By doing good (i.e. loving their neighbours), 
rectifying injustices and treating others equitably (thus practising mishpat, discussed in 3.2.2 
above), and to live upright and godly lives among the pagans (displaying tzadeqah, 3.2.2 
above), a taste may be given of the justice offered by allegiance to the City of God. 
His depiction of the final establishment of the City of God in perfect, eternal peace and 
justice, is however the pinnacle of Augustine’s argument against the pagans. Throughout the 
second main section of the City of God (Books 11 to 22), it is clear that Augustine views all 
of human history as working toward the Final Judgement. The City of Man has been moving 
steadily toward destruction and eternal death since its beginning, with the restlessness, flux 
and chaos that Augustine’s target audience felt acutely providing but a taste of what lay 
ahead. In complete contrast, citizens of the Heavenly City looked forward to eternal peace 
and stability, and life characterised by perfect justice.   
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 Examples include civ. Dei 21.17-21.27 and 22.11-12. These have not been included, due to the 
length and complexity of Augustine’s arguments in these sections. The example of his tactic provided 
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Appendix A: Summary of civ. Dei 19-22 
 
The following summary presents Books 19 to 22 of the City of God.
81
 They form the final 
section of the work, following Augustine’s own division thereof into five parts, according to 
a letter to the layman Firmus, as first noted by Dom C. Lambot and published in 1939 
(Bettenson 2003: lxvi): 
1. Books 1-5: “[…] against those that maintain that the worship of the gods […] leads to 
happiness in this life.” 
2. Books 6-10: “[…] against those who maintain that suchlike deities are to be 
worshipped by rites and sacrifices in order to secure happiness in the life to come.” 
3. Books 11-14: The origins of the two cities. 
4. Books 15-18: The progress (or development) of the two cities. 
5. Books 19-22: The predestined ends of the two cites. 
  
Another common way of breaking up the text is found in Augustine’s Retractationes (Evans 
2003:  xxxiii): 
1. Books 1-10: “The ‘vain opinions’ of the adversaries of the City of God”. 
2. Books 11-22: 
a. Books 11-14: the origins of the two cities; the city of this world and the City 
of God. 
b. Books 15-17: the growth of the two cities. 
c. Books 18-22: the ‘due ends’ of the two cities. 
 
Augustine, reflecting on his life work near the end of his days, says the following regarding 
his purpose in writing the City of God: “Burning with zeal for the house of God I began to 
write the books of the City of God against the blasphemies and errors [of its enemies]” 
(Retract. 2.69; cited in Evans 2003: xxxiii). 
Summary: 
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headings given to the chapters by Bettenson. 
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Book 19: 
What is man’s supreme Good? Peace. Everything is directed towards peace, even war. (Bettenson: 
lxiii) 
1. Discussion of how philosophers had defined the Supreme Good and Evil. “For our Final Good is 
that for which other things are to be desired, while it is itself to be desired for its own sake. The 
Final Evil is that for which other things are to be shunned, while it is itself to be shunned on its 
own account”. Philosophers mentioned: Varro, Stoics, Cynics, Epicureans, Plato, Old- and New 
Academy, Aristotle.  
2. Varro: 3 kinds of Supreme Good. 
3. Varro influenced by the Old Academy. A discussion of virtue. 
4. The Christian view of the Supreme Good and Supreme Evil, contrasted with that of the 
philosophers, who found the Supreme Good within themselves. 
- Justice considered a “highest good” / discussion of the virtue of justice 
5. Social life as both valuable and dangerous. 
- Peace 
- Enmity 
6. Earthly judges and the mistakes made by them (to the point of perpetrating injustice in pursuit of 
justice), when the truth is hidden. See also: Epistles 133, 134 and 139. 
7. Differences in language divide people. 
8. Friendship between men: inevitably plagued by life’s trouble. 
9. Friendship between men and the holy angels? Obscured by demons’ deception. 
 
10. Victory over temptation and resultant virtuous living will be rewarded. 
 
11. Everlasting peace in the City of God (the City’s predetermined end) is the final fulfilment of all the 
earthly goods of the saints. 
12. Peace is every person’s/creature’s aim, and is even the purpose of war. 
- Analysis of ego-centric peace 
- Natural justice in social context: God-given peace 
o Note: ‘natural’ = of God; ‘evil’ = perverse/perverted/disordered 
13. Peace = order. Universal peace (order) kept by a law of nature (God-given nature, not “sinful 
nature”), despite any disturbances: the individual attains, by God’s ordinance, to the nature he has 
deserved by his free choice. 
- Common grace and temporal peace viewed in the eternal context. 
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14. Law and order (earthly and heavenly) by which individuals and society (from family to society at 
large) are governed. The righteous live by the faith and not by sight. 
15. Man’s natural (God-given?) freedom and slavery/enslavement as the just deserts (wages) of sin. 
- order = peace = natural justice 
- 1st cause of slavery = sin, which is dealt out ultimately by God, who is perfectly just. 
- most pitiless enslaving lust = lust for power/domination 
- slavery as punishment is ordained by the law which enjoins in the preservation of the order of 
nature (see 19.13). 
- slavery will come to an end when “injustice is annihilated, and God is all in all.” 
16. Masters and slaves as equals in the Christian household. Punishment as beneficial to the offender, 
to keep the peace (and order!). Note also: hermeneutic circle: household order and order of the city 
determine (and are determined by) each other. 
17. Earthly and heavenly peace (within each city) + the origin of peace and discord between the two 
cities. 
- Peace defined again: “[...] for this peace is the perfectly ordered and completely harmonious 
fellowship in the enjoyment of God, and of each other in God”. 
18. Steadfast certainty of the Christian faith (unlike the hesitations of the New Academy). 
 
19. Christian behaviour and dress. (also Bishops as having a task based on love of the Truth.) 
 
20. Peace = Supreme Good of the City of God. The citizens of the City of God are made happy now, 
by their hope in what is to come. 
 
21. Back to Cicero’s Scipio’s definition of a commonwealth: was it ever a reality in Rome? (not 
according to Augustine!) 
- Note: commonwealth = “the weal of the people”(Cicero) 
A people = a “multitude united in association by a common sense of right and a 
community of interest.” (Cicero) 
“common sense of right” discussed, showing that a state cannot be maintained 
without justice, and where there is no justice, there can be no right (the two are 
inextricably linked). 
- Extensive discussion of justice 
 
22. The true God, to whom alone sacrifice is due. (cf. Books 1-5?) 
23. Porphyry (an adversary) on the oracles about Christ given by the gods Apollo (pp. 884-887) and 
Hecate (pp. 887ff) and the conflicting views in them, though Porphyry agrees with both. 
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24. Alternative (Christian?) definition of ‘people’ and ‘commonwealth’. 
- Keywords: rational beings, love, God, law, justice. 
25. True virtue is impossible without true (Christian) religion. Without true religion, the soul is subject 
to the rule of vicious demons. 
26. Peace in this life, of the people alienated from God, is used by God’s People in their pilgrimage. 
27. Peace of God’s servants – a perfect tranquillity, not experienced in this life, although a life of faith 
makes some degree of peace possible in this life (peace and justice for the individual, now and in 
eternity discussed). 
28. The end of the wicked. 
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Book 20: 
The last judgement. Law and order. More discussion of Scipio’s republic. (Bettenson: lxiii) 
1. God judges at all times, but the subject of Book 20 is the Final Judgement, when Christ will come 
to judge both the living and the dead; good summary of the mechanics of the Judgement. 
- “For as the Apostle says, ‘There is no injustice in God’ (Rom 9:4); and as he says in another 
place, ‘His judgements are inscrutable, and his ways untraceable’ (Rom 11:33). 
2. Diversity of human fortunes (context: theodicy issue); but God’s judgements not absent, rather 
untraceable. 
- More about God’s just character and the justice of His judgements – all to be revealed at the 
Final Judgement 
- Set no store to temporal goods, but pursue Eternal Good 
3. Solomon (Ecclesiastes!) 
 
4. NT and OT testimonies re. the Final Judgement. 
5. Jesus’ statements re. the Final Judgement. 
- Final Judgement 
- Present intermingling of the cities of God and man, and future Judgement 
o See also letter to Hesychius On the End of the World (Ep., 199, 2nd of 2 letters to 
Hecychius, bishop of Salona, in answer to a query about the apocalyptic chronology in 
Dan. 9:24ff) 
6. Two resurrections for the people of God: 1st of the soul (resurrection of mercy), 2nd of the body 
(final resurrection of judgement). 
7. The two resurrections, and discussion of the meaning of the 1000years; the descriptions of John in 
the Apocalypse, and their interpretation. 
- Also Satan’s seduction of humankind before his binding 
8. The Devil bound and ‘unloosed’ 
- Aside: Augustine’s strong view of baptism 
9. The nature of the kingdom of the saints lasting 1000years (as it is now, while the Devil is 
bound?), and its difference from the Eternal Kingdom. 
10. Resurrection: only of the body, or of the soul too? Also some discussion of millennialism, if the 
resurrections are only physical. 
11. Gog and Magog, agents of Satan, who will persecute until the end of the world. 
12. Gog and Magog consumed by fire. The fire of the Final Punishment. 
13. The final persecution of the Church (300½ years) and how it fits into the 1000yrs. 
14. The condemnation of Satan and his followers. Summary: the resurrection of the body and the 
Final Judgement. 
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15. Augustine explains: the dead given up by the sea, Death, and Hades. 
 
16. The New Heaven and the New Earth 
17. The eternal glory/splendour of the City of God (the Church of God) after the End. 
 
18–30. Biblical statements/references concerning the End: 
18. 2 Peter 3: 3-13 (the Last Judgement as certain and the precedents for that certainty) 
19. 2 Thess. 2: 1-12 (Antichrist before the Day of the Lord) 
20. 1 Thess. 4: 13-17 (the resurrection of the dead etc.) 
21. Isaiah 26:19 [LXX], 66:12-16; also other passages (the resurrection and judgement of 
retribution) 
22. The saints will “go out” [of the City] and so, know about the punishment of the wicked, who 
won’t know about the “joy of the Lord” [inside the City]. 
23. Daniel 7 and 12 (Antichrist, judgement, reign of the saints) 
24. Psalms (the End and the final Judgement) 
25. Malachi 3: 1-6 (Last Judgement and the purifying punishments) 
26. “Sacrifices pleasing to the Lord” (various Scriptures) 
27. Malachi 3:17-4:3 (God will return to sep. the righteous from the wicked) 
28. Mosaic Law to be interpreted “spiritually”, as opposed to literally. 
29. Elijah’s return before the judgement, for the conversion of the Jews. 
30. OT prophecies of the Judgement don’t mention Christ explicitly. But some passages, where 
God is the speaker, make it clear that He is identified with Christ. 
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Book 21: The punishment of the people of Satan (citizens of the city of man) 
How is eternal punishment possible? Pain of soul or body? Does temporal punishment exist after 
death for some? (Bettenson: lxiii) 
1. The punishment of the wicked treated first, because after all are united with their resurrection 
bodies, it’s less credible (for Augustine’s detractors) that eternal bodies (of the damned) should 
endure eternal punishment, than that eternal bodies (of the saints) should go on in eternal felicity. 
2. Argument that a material body can be exempt from destruction by fire. 
3. Answer to the complaint that a physical body can’t endure pain and simultaneously be incapable of 
death. 
4. Evidence from nature that bodies can live under conditions of torture. 
5. Many things (miracles/marvels) should be believed although no rational proof is available. 
6. Though some marvels aren’t natural (of God): many are the products of man’s ingenuity or of 
demons’ wiles. 
7. God’s omnipotence is the basis for belief in marvels. / If God had (has) power to create all things, 
and to fill His creation with all manner of marvels, why not raise the bodies of the dead and punish 
the damned into eternity? 
8. If some or other property of a substance changes, that is not contrary to nature. (answer to the 
objection that human bodies are not constituted now, to allow for the eternal punishment sans 
physical demise argued for by Augustine) 
9. The nature of the eternal punishment: warnings from Scripture (e.g. Isaiah 66:24) not to be taken 
lightly – acc. to Augustine, the fire will be material and is not meant to be a mere picture. 
10. If Hell’s fire is taken to be material, can it affect immaterial demons? Conclusion from Scripture: 
yes. 
11. The proportion of [duration of offense / sin] : [duration of punishment]. The objection that eternal 
punishment for temporal sins is unjust doesn’t stand; even in this life, the duration of the 
punishment does not perfectly accord with the time taken to commit the offence. 
12. It is the gravity/magnitude of the Original Sin that makes all who are outside the Saviour’s grace 
liable to eternal punishment. 
13. The Platonists’ idea that even punishment after death is simply to the end purification, is false. 
14. Some of the temporal pains (of this life) that are part and parcel of the human condition. 
 
15. God’s redeeming work (in its entirety) has reference to the world to come. 
16. The different ‘laws of grace’ that govern every stage of the regenerate’s life. 
 
Some other opinions: 
17. The opinion that the punishment of the damned will not last forever. 
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18. The opinion that all men will be saved from damnation by the intercession of the saints on 
their behalf. 
19. The opinion that even heretics will escape punishment, through participation in the Body of 
Christ (at the Lord’s table). 
20.  The belief that all members of the Catholic church (having had the sacraments administered 
to them etc.) will be saved, regardless of how irreligious/evil/sinful their lives. 
21. See Chapter 20 above. 
22. The opinion that those who also engaged in acts of mercy will not be condemned for their 
offenses. 
 
Augustine refutes the opinions in Chapters 17-22: 
23. Refutation of those who hold that devils (demons) may also be saved. 
24. Refutation of the view that the guilty will be spared through the saints’ intercession. 
25. Refutation of the notion that heretics of evil life / lapsed Catholics / Catholics of evil life will 
be saved from eternal punishment through the sacraments. 
26. The meaning of having Christ as the ‘foundation’; and of ‘saved by fire’. 
27. Refutation of the argument that works of mercy will atone for persistent wickedness. 
  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
84 
 
Book 22: The resurrection and eternal bliss of God’s people (citizens of the City of God) 
Creation and resurrection. Miracles still occur in the Christian Church. The Vision of God. 
(Bettenson: lxiii) 
1. This book to treat of the eternal bliss of the City of God. The creation of angels and men. God’s 
justice and grace. 
2. The eternal and unchangeable will of God. (God’s justice cont.) 
3. In fulfilment of OT covenant and prophecy: eternal bliss for the saints. 
4. Answer to the worldly-wise (scholars and philosophers) who claim that earthly bodies cannot be 
transferred to Heaven. 
5. Christ’s physical resurrection and ascension, which some refuse to believe, despite its general 
acceptance. 
6. On the ‘founding fathers’: unlike the Romans, who made Romulus a god because they loved him 
(ref. to Cicero), the Church loved/loves Christ, because they believe Him to be God. 
7. The world’s belief in Christ as due to the power of God and not to human persuasion, for the 
gospel was accepted during time of great scepticism. 
 
8. Miracles, which occurred in the past to make the world believe, have not ceased now that the 
world does believe. Examples of ‘contemporary’ miracles known to Augustine. Also mention of 
the fact that those who ask for miracles now are their own biggest obstacle to belief; they are 
simply trying to disprove belief in the miracles of the past. 
9. Miracles performed by the martyrs in Christ’s name bear witness to their faith in Christ. 
10. The superiority of the martyrs over the demons, and the difference between their miracles. 
 
11. An answer to the Platonists contention that an earthly body cannot exist in Heaven. “The 
conclusion is that the Platonist’s arguments for the classification of the elements by weight cannot 
set limits on the power of the Almighty God so that he cannot make our bodies capable even of a 
dwelling in the heavens.” 
 
12. Reply to the calumnies (incl. examinations of people’s physical condition at death and relation to 
resurrection) with which unbelievers pour scorn on the Christian belief in resurrection. 
13. The problem of abortive births. 
14. The question whether infants at the resurrection will have the body they would have had at 
maturity. 
15. Will all resurrected bodies attain the stature of the Lord’s body? 
16. Meaning of “shaped into the likeness of God’s Son” 
17. Will women retain their sex in the resurrected body? Augustine argues “yes”! 
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18. Christ, the perfect man; and the Church, his Body and his fulfilment. Note ref. to Eph. 4:10ff. 
19. The perfection of the resurrected body. 
20. The restoration of the whole body at the resurrection, regardless of how its parts may have been 
dispersed. 
21. The new and spiritual body of the saints. 
 
22. The miseries to which Original sin has exposed mankind, relief from which only comes through 
the grace of Christ Jesus: “From this life of misery, a kind of hell on earth, there is no liberation 
save through the grace of Christ our Saviour, our God and our Lord. His name is Jesus; and 
Jesus, we know, means Saviour. And, above all, it is his grace which will save us from a worse life, 
or rather death, after this life; and that death will be everlasting. [...]” 
 
23. Additional afflictions peculiar to the saints “in their warfare against evil propensities, and in the 
temptations and perils in which those battles involve them” and their triumph over them in Christ! 
24. The many good things in this life, even though it is subject to condemnation. 
 
25. The obstinacy of those who deny the resurrection of the body. 
26. Porphyry’s contention, that the soul can have no contact with a body in order to enjoy true bliss, is 
refuted by Plato. 
27. “Plato and Porphyry each made certain statements which might have brought them to become 
Christians if they had exchanged them with one another.” The contradictions between Plato and 
Porphyry. If they had yielded to one another in these they would not be far from the truth. 
28. How Plato, Labeo, or even Varro might have brought themselves to a true faith in the resurrection, 
if their opinions had been combined into a unified statement. 
 
29. The kind of vision with which the saints will see God, in the world to come, for now it is beyond 
our intellectual capabilities to know/understand the peace of God that the saints will experience 
when the City of God is established. 
30. The eternal and perfect felicity of the saints in the City of God, in its perpetual Sabbath rest/peace. 
 
 
 Postscript: 
“And now, as I think, I have discharged my debt, with the completion, by God’s help, of this huge 
work. It may be too much for some, too little for others. Of both these groups I ask forgiveness. But of 
those for whom it is enough I make this request: that they do not thank me, but join with me in 
rendering thanks to God. Amen. Amen.”  
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Appendix B:  James Sire’s seven basic questions of world view82 
In the introduction to his insightful catalogue of modern worldviews, Sire gives seven 
questions designed to get to the heart of every worldview.  This follows on from his claim 
that one’s worldview may be expressed in a set of presuppositions (Sire 2009: 20). The 
following extract (Sire 2009: 22-23) is given as an expansion of the worldview analysis frame 
mentioned in 4.2.1 (page 43n55). Though it is not referred to in the main text, it has informed 
some of the stances taken in this paper to some degree. 
1. What is prime reality? […]  To this we might answer: God, or gods, or the material 
cosmos. Our answer here is the most fundamental. It sets the boundaries for the 
answers that can consistently be given to the other six questions. […] 
2. What is the nature of external reality […]? Here our answers point to whether we 
see the world as created or autonomous, as chaotic or orderly, as matter or spirit; or 
whether we emphasise our subjective, personal relationship to the world or its 
objectivity apart from us. 
3. What is a human being? Here we might answer: a highly complex machine, a 
sleeping god, a person made in the image of God, a naked ape. 
4. What happens to a person at death? Here we might reply: personal extinction, or 
transformation to a higher state, or reincarnation, or departure to a shadowy existence 
on “the other side.” 
5. Why is it possible to know anything at all? Sample answers include the idea that we 
are made in the image of an omniscient God or that consciousness and rationality 
developed under the contingencies of survival in a long process of evolution. 
6. How do we know what is right and wrong? (Grounds for ethics) Again, perhaps we 
are made in the image of a God whose character is good, or right and wrong are 
determined by human choice alone, […] or the notions simply developed under an 
impetus toward cultural or physical survival. 
7. What is the meaning of human history? To this we might answer: to realise the 
purposes of God or the gods, to make a paradise on earth, to prepare people for a life 
in community with […] God. 
                                                          
82
 Sire (2009: 23) adds an eighth question in the fifth edition of his book, which deals with the life-
orienting core commitments that are consistent with worldview (i.e. worldview as a “matter of the 
heart”). This question, though it does flesh out the personal implications of the more abstract 
questions listed here, does not bear much relevance for this paper. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
87 
 
Appendix C: The “peace tabulation” of civ. Dei 19.13-14 
TeSelle (1993: 92-94) sets out and explains what has been called Augustine’s “peace 
tabulation” from civ. Dei 19.13-14. He does this, drawing on the work of certain German 
scholars (Harald Fuchs, 1926; Joachim Laufs, 1973). This peace tabulation is helpful 
inasmuch as it summarises Augustine’s perspective on peace both in the City of Man and the 
City of God. It is given here, without the explanatory comments made by TeSelle: 
The peace of the body is the ordered harmony of its parts, unmolested by pain; 
The peace of the irrational soul is the ordered repose of its appetites, undisturbed 
by desire; 
The peace of the body and soul together is the ordered life and health of the living 
being, without dissolution by death. 
The peace of the rational soul is an ordered agreement between knowledge and 
action; 
The peace of the mortal person with God is an ordered obedience, in faith, to the 
eternal law. 
The peace of human beings is an ordered concord, loving one’s neighbour as 
oneself, doing no harm, helping wherever possible; 
The peace of the household is the ordered concord of command and obedience 
among those who live together; 
The peace of the city is an ordered concord of command and obedience among 
citizens. 
The peace of the celestial city is the supremely ordered and supremely harmonious 
association of enjoying God and each other in God. 
The peace of all things is the tranquillity of order, and order is the dispensing of 
all things, equal and unequal, giving to each thing its place. 
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